Assassination Records Review Board
Final Determination Notification
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORD SERIES : JCS CENTRAL PILES 19 62
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)
October 20, 1957
Status of Document: Postponed in Part
Number of releases of previously postponed Information: 0
Number of Postponements: 5
Postponement # 1 (Page DJSM-909-62,25 July 1962, pg 2):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the
military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
may be postponed under Section 6<1)(C) of the JFK Act
Substitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017
0
Postponement #2 (Page JCS 1969/347, 2 May 1962,pp 6/*): '
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the
military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017
Postponement # 3 (Page JCS 1969/ 34 7,Mari time Support, Operation Mongoose, 8 May 1962,pg 1):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the
military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
may be postponed under Section 6{1)(C) of the JFK Act
1
Substitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017
Postponement # 4 (Page JCS 1969/389, 23 July 1962,pp 14-15):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the
military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
may be postponed under Section 6(1)(C) of the JFK Act
Substitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017
Postponement # 5 (Page OP605F/br, Ser 000374P60, 24 April 1962,pp 2-4):
Reason for Board Action: The text is redacted because it touches on a matter currently relating to the
military defense, intelligence operations or conduct of foreign relations of the United States that properly
may be postponed under Section 6(1 KQ of the JFK Act.
Substitute Language: Operational Details
Release Date: 10/2017
Board Review Completed: 10/14/97
2
Date : 10/09/97
Page : 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 (7 FEB 62)
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : JCS
FROM :
TO :
TITLE : NORTHWOODS
DATE : 00/00/62
PAGES : 197
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEAN SECURITY
PATROL POSTS
INVASION OF CUBA
JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Files 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Case, Code
Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS
recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify
US military intervention.
[R] - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
Date : 10/15/97
Page : 1
JFK ASSASSINATION SYSTEM
IDENTIFICATION FORM
AGENCY INFORMATION
AGENCY : JCS
RECORD NUMBER : 202-10002-10104
RECORDS SERIES : JCS CENTRAL FILES 1962
AGENCY FILE NUMBER : 3360 {7 FEB 62)
DOCUMENT INFORMATION
ORIGINATOR : JCS
. FROM :
TO :
TITLE : NORTHWOODS
DATE : 00/00/62
PAGES : 197
SUBJECTS : U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
CONTINGENCY PLANNING, CUBA
OPERATION MONGOOSE
UPRISINGS IN CUBA
COVERT OPERATIONS, CUBA
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA
CARIBBEAN SECURITY
PATROL POSTS
INVASION OF CUBA
JUSTIFICATION FOR U. S. MILITARY INTERVENTION
DOCUMENT TYPE : PAPER, TEXTUAL DOCUMENT
CLASSIFICATION : UNCLASSIFIED
RESTRICTIONS : 1C
CURRENT STATUS : RELEASED WITH DELETIONS
DATE OF LAST REVIEW : 10/07/97
OPENING CRITERIA :
COMMENTS : JCS Central Fileo 1962, Box 29. JCS Record Caoc, Code
Name Northwoods, containing JCS Papers related to JCS
recommendation to invade Cuba and pretexts to justify
US military intervention.
IR) - ITEM IS RESTRICTED
^ fafltrchP
Declassification Review/Postponement Form
Originator:
Subject:
Original Level of Classification
Third Agency Equities
ei fiit*/ ctjl
Remarks
00 ^
Btufeti f
EXEMPTED FROM DECLASSIFICATION
BY JOINT STAFF AT TA&?
EXEMPTION: 0 (0(()
declassified
MONTH _S-
authority.
UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY
OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL
DECLASSIFICATION UNIT
'iTlOtf
1
THIS AGENCY HAS DECLASSIFIED ALL OF
USIA’S HOLDING IN THIS DOCUMENT IN
COMPLIANCE WITH
cocoas
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20301
JCS RECORD CASE NO.
3360 (7 Feb 62 )
SUBJECT
N0RTHW00DS
SECTION NO.
SEE SEC. NO. |,
R ACCESS NO. I PREPARED BY
SC I CY JCS PAPERS
JCSM 103-62
REMARKS AND/OR SUBJECT | XX
JCSM 158-62
SM-240-62
SM -241-62
SM-242-62
SM-243-62
JCSM-166-62
JCSM 272-62
JCSM 365-62
JCSM-355-62
JCSM 367-62
DJSM 909-62
JCSM 564-62
DJS Unnumbered
CJCS Unnumberec
CJCS Unnumbere
FORM NO. 2
JAN 69
M.HN1I iu
JCS RECORD CASE CONTENTS
R&RA BR., JOINT SECRETARIAT
PILE , NO. /^-
3360 (7 Feb
CROSS INDEX No's
Code - NORPHWOODS
Name - CRAIG; B/Gen.
3330
57^0
Rtaulor INITIATED SY
subject- N0RTHW00DS (S)
Report by Gen. CraigV; Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/303
A Report; Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/306
A Report - Referred to the Chiefs
A Report - Refered to th<* Chiefs
Decision on JCS 1969/311
decision on JCS 1969/310-
A Report - Referred to JCS
A Report - Referred to JCS
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/31h U 1969/316
A Report - referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/321
Decision on JCS 1 969/31 3
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1 969/324
A Report - Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/325
A Report Referred to JCS
A Report referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/327
Decision on JCS 1969/328
Controlled Distribution
ICS CASE TILE COVER SHEE1
DATE
| AOENCY PAPER NO.
, | JCS PAPER NO.
i/m/m
imimi
7 Feb 62
8 Feb 62
1969/303 'jr
13 Feb 62
15 Feb 62
1969/306 /fr
20 Feb 61
1969/310 V
20 Feb 61
20-Feb-62
20 Feb 62
1969/311 ^
27 Feb 62
1969/313 f -
27-Feb-62
1969/314
5 M|ar
5 War 62
1969/316 *
7 Mar 62
•
12 Mar 62
13 Mar 62
7 Mar 62
1969/ 321
20- Mar -62
21 - Har -62
1969/324 ^
23-Mar-62
1969/325 ^
27-Mar-62
•
29 Mar 62 J.
1969/327
29 Mar 62
1969/328 p
? 27 Mar 62 { :
30 Mar 62
PENTAGON. WITHIN 5 I
.. .
OTHERWISE SPECIFIED,
GDS Review 18 SEP 1974
R&RA BR., JOINT SECRETARIAT
3W(?-Feb-62)
page 2
REQUEST INlTIAnCD BY
subject- NORTHWOODS (S)
Paper
A Ta’JMrtgReferred to JCS
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/334
Decision on JCS 1969/335
•
Report Referred to JCS
Report Referred to JCS
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/343
Decision on JCS 1969/344
Decision on JCS 1969/347
A Report referred to JCS
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/366
Decision on JCS 1969/367
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/339
A Report Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969/39?
A Report - u eferred to JCS
A rt eport - Referred to JCS
Decision on JCS 1969 AH
Decision on JCS 1969 Al2
A Report Referred to JCS
9-Apr-62
9- Apr-62
1 0- Apr-62
IO-Apr-62
27-Apr-62
1 27 Apr 62
?-May-62
8-te y-62
8- Kay-62
9- May-62
12-June-62
1 2-Juno-62
13 Jim 62
15 Jun 62
23 Jul 62
27-Jul-62
2 Aug 62
8
Aug
62
31
Aug
62
31
Aug
62
31
Aug
62
31
Aug
62
1
Sep
62
;>
JCS CASE FILE COVER SHEET
AOKNCY PAPER NO. | JCS P APER NO.
1969/334
1969/335 *-
1969/343
1969/344 JjL
1969/347 ^
1969/366
1969/367
1969/389
0
196Q/392
1969A11 ^r
1969A12
J969A13 ^
™'l' a ™ K CH.EP-S or DTAPP MASTER C^OE P,LE COPY t , T MUST BE RETURNED TO THE
REFERENCE PAR. 40 (4> JAI 3740.1
JCS,^ e no. 2
ftntrolled Distributing
Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. On 2 August 1962, the Chief of Operations, Operation
Mongoose, requested the DOD/JCS Representative, Operation
Mongoose, to' prepare a paper for distribution to the Special
Group (Augmented) on 8 August 1§62. The specific requirement
is to set forth " Consequences of (US) Military Intervention
(in Cuba) to include coot (personnel, units and equipment),
effect on world-wide ability to react, possibility of a
requirement for sustained occupation, the level of national
mobilization required, and Cuban counteraction."
2. It is recommended that you approve the attached
memorandum for distribution to the Special Group (Augmented).
If more specific and detailed information is required by the
Group, I will be prepared to provide it orally.
L. L. LEKNrTZER /
Chairman /
Joint Chiefs of Staff
EXCLUDED FROM G05
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
fit my/
• 7 August 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF
Subject: Consequences of US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS) (JCS 1969/392)
1. Pursuant to the discussion of the subject item at today '3
meeting of the Operations Deputies, the following material
is submitted for addition to Enclosure A (page 4) of the
subject paper:
"3. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, while agreeing
that positive and successful military intervention in Cuba
is fully within current US capability, is of the opinion
that the attached memorandum is unduly optimistic in its
appraisal of the force requirements, duration, -and con-
sequences of such an action. He has expressed the following
reservations with respect to the several elements of the
analysis:
" ‘a. Cost (personnel, units, and equipment)
I notice that this element is treated in
terms of the magnitude of force commitment and no specific
estimate is made of cost in terms of personnel casualties,
material consumed, and equipment to be replaced or rehabil- *
itated. Even if this treatment is considered acceptable,
I do not consider that the ground forces now shown are adequate
for the intended purpose within the indicated time frame. .
If the Castro regime is to be confronted with the prospect
of overpowering force, and casualties reduced by early
capitulation, I consider that a minimum of three (3)
infantry divisions should be introduced immediately after an
entry point ha3 been seized by amphibious/airborne assault.
'U. Level of National Mobilization Required .
(1) Adequate ground combat forces are available
In our current force levels even If the scale of intervention
niiAt
EXCLUDED FROM CDS
is increased as indicated above. The same situation does
not appear to apply with respect to tactical airlift and
military government/civil affairs units. If all elements
of the intervention force are to have the same degree of
readiness and preparation, it would appear necessary to resort
to partial prior mobilization in these areas.
• •
(2) The foregoing consideration is addressed
only to direct commitment in Cuba. Restoration of our
capability to respond quickly to heightened tensions in
other areas might well require additional mobilization
approaching the scale of that undertaken during the Berlin
crisis.
A critical point here is the duration of
involvement of major elements of our strategic reserve in
Cuba. From examination of time and distance factors, and
assessment of the probable level of opposition, I cannot
agree that the indicated time frame is adequate to introduce
and deploy forces of this magnitude, establish effective
control, install an effective new government, turn over control
to that government, withdraw and rehabilitate our forces,
and place those forces in a renewed readiness posture in
CONUS. In my opinion a much longer time would be involved
and during this period our ability to respond to other crisis
would be seriously reduced.
" ’d. Castro-Cuban Counteraction . The statement is made
that Cuban defensive plans are believed to contemplate a strong
initial resistance, followed by a determined defense of
preselected keypoints, and finally by protracted guerrilla
warfare. This statement is from the current National
Intelligence Estimate which also states that the present
military establishment as a whole is politically reliable.
2
* •• -If Castro's Cuba is only partially successful in the execution
of its defensive plans, combat operations could be of
considerably longer duration than anticipated with personnel
and materiel casualties increasing proportionally.
Occupation . The present wording makes no mention of the very
real probability that a US provisional military government
f; * *
would be required for an extended period of time. Considering
the size (44,206 sq. mi.) and population (6,743,000) of Cuba,
***»
its long history' of political unrest, and its tradition of
sustained and extensive guerrilla and terrorist resistance to
constituted authority, the estimate that only a division-size
force will be required subsequent to the assault phase appears
modest. I consider it more probable that a cl^an-up and
occupation force of three infantry divisions and associated
support units would be required for a considerable period.
This is in addition to the need for a military government/
civil affairs establishment capable of directing the civil
and economic affairs of Cuba until we can organize and install
a successor regime capable of responsible self-government.
This period of transition, re-organization, and economic
rehabilitation might well continue for several years.' "
— ■
C. H. HAYES
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps
Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans)
I ■
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
HANDLING |
mjmx&SR-
KEROKAK&UH FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
US Contingency Pisa No. 2, Cuba (S)
*
I
I 1*1 have reviewed subject paper (JCS 1969/389) and
racocrusr.d that tho following changes be nada in order .
to take full cor^Usanco of tho possible requirement far
! reducing military roaction tlca to looo than eighteen
i (18) days#
I
2* Paga 12, paragraph 3a(3)> change to read as follows i -
(o) With no prior warning • . . result In pinlaun
US end Cuban ca dual ties, ££-«H9*a-lt»-«-v*ew Iro&QhZ « • »
dole to remainder of paragraph through 4d4-Weaihep-4*a-fi
lixited- eaten*} v
require r>ent to re due a significantly tho
>ra-asuault period would necessitate incremental commitment
of US forces no they, could to assembled and employed. Tho
ti!t» required to gain essential US military control
appreciably oxtcndad. Rwevor. reduotlon of US nilitary re-
action tine nay bo of overriding inportanco. In such case
on airborne assault could bo initiated in five
followed by air- 3 ended unite as soon aa airfields nro
EXCLUDED FROM COS
excluded a/j automatic
REGRADING; DOD DIP 6200.10
DOES WOT APPLY
TOP sre
SPECIAL
within eight (8) 'da
reaood the risk of hoavler caoualtloo on both oldest
.o)—?hg— cltuatlon could doaand noro 1 jgasdiafce
reaction than oraplo;
Increrssntal c
nt of force 3
nflr©
tlio Cocnninlot Cuban flovornaent. US military plana will
rovldp fox* a rapid comltnent of air
end initiation of a blcclcado prior to the sirbonse/ftr:
assault, w
3. To be oonalotent with changes roconacnded above, pag©
14, paragraph 3b(3) ctaould bo charged in the first tv;o
con to nee s ao follows*
war
25 July 1962
•*M**. # *t
NOTE TO CONTROL DIVISION:
•Subject: JOS 1969/389 - HQRTHW00D3 (S)
At their meeting on 25 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff considered the subject paper along with
*
CSAFM 226-62, DJSM- 909-62 and a Marine Corps Flimsy, this
subject, dated 25 July, all of which were tabled at this
meeting, and agreed to defer this item. It was also agreed
to refer the subject paper and all purples to General Harris
for revision in the light of the discussion held at the meeting.
Further, it was agreed to have this revision circulated with
a view toward obtaining approval from each of the Joint
Chiefs on an individual basis; should suoh approval not be
obtained, this item will be rescheduled on the Friday, 27 July
agenda.
SYSTEMATICALLY
BY JCS ON- —
CLASSIFICATION CONTINUED
M U. INGMJDO
Colonel, USAF
Secretary
to Enclosure A
’•'v
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t r\
* reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat
..
EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
COPY NO. 1
V- ' *
:
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
‘ ■ • 'i
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
• ° n
NORTHWOODS (S)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
M. J. INGELIDO
, *
R. C. FORBES
' * ' ' V
Joint Secretariat
■ : M :#
VaUDED FROM CD s
*
wrx OF COPIES
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
mil'
US CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested*' by the Chief of Operations, Operation
MONGOOSE, to develop an interagency contingency plan for US
military intervention in Cuba.
ASSUMPTIONS
2. It is possible that a spontaneous uprising could occur
in Cuba. A resistance movement against the Communist Cuban
government could develop a situation that the United States
may desire to exploit.
3. The United States will pursue the overthrow of the
Communist Cuban government.
PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
4. The Department of Defense/Joint Chiefs of Staff
representative to the Caribbean Survey Group is responsible*
for the preparation of a contingency plan for US actions
which include military intervention, in a situation of open,
wide-spread revolt in Cuba.
5. Normal readiness of forces will permit execution of
CINCLANT Operations Plan No. 3l4-6l** a t any time subsequent
to eighteen (l8) days after the decision to implement the
plan.
6. For additional facts bearing on the problem see
Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
7. For discussion see Enclosure C.
CONCLUSIONS
8. The plan attached at Enclosure A provides suitable
response to the requirement for a contingency plan.
* ” e “°T representatives of State, Defense, CIA, USIA, from
b/g Lansdale, subject. Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,
HarrL^ e Smce? nnln8/ dated 14 ^ 1962; ° n flle ln aen
** Contingency Operations Plan No. 314-61 (cruba) fs).
dated 22 July 1961, as amended; on file in Joinc Secretariat.
RECOMMENDATIONS
9. It is recommended that:
a. The contingency plan at Enclosure A hereto be approved
apd forwarded to Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE,
through the Secretary of Defense.
b. A copy of this paper be forwarded %o CINCLANT and
C INC STRIKE.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
I
■rival '
K'l LI l
DRAFT
ENCLOSURE A
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)
1. As requested in memorandum for representatives of
State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,
Contingency Planning," dated 14 June 1962, the attached
plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to delivery to
the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.
2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of
military intervention dealt with in this plan take three
principal forms. These are, in descending order of magnitude:
a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation capable
of confronting the Castro regime with the prospect of
over-powering force.
b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser airborne
and amphibious forces building up as feasible to the scale
of the primary plan. This method entaiis greater risk,
longer time to establish fully effective control, and the
probability of greater casualties on both sides.
c. An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro
military forces and facilities to support and assist the
revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent opera-
tions.
3. The above described alternative methods conform essen-
tially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency operations
in Cuba.
4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of State
during preparation in order to be consistent with and
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
t 4 Enclosure A
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)
1
complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State which
addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban revolt but is
limited to US actions less than military intervention.
5 . Operations outlined within this plan for the Department
of State, Central Intelligence Agency and US Information
Agency were prepared by each agency concerned.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. LEMNITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Enclosure A
(Amended as directed by the Jo^nt Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)
UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)
Appendix to
Enclosure A
Ail
DRAFT
5^12 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence
The Director, US Information Agency
Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2, Cuba (S)
1. The attached plan delineates the course of action to be
pursued by the United States in the event that US military
intervention is undertaken in support of open, wide-spread
revolt in Cuba.
2. Subject plan is effective for planning on receipt and
for the conduct of operations when directed.
3. This document requires special handling and is not
releasable to foreign nationals.
FOR THE 5^12 SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED):
EDWARD G. LANSDALE
Brigadier General, USAF
Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING-
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY ’
Ullrfl
1. The title of this document is:
UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (s)
2. The title of this document is classified SECRET. The
plan may be referred to as the Caribbean Survey Group (or,
CSG) Plan No. 2, which name is unclassified unless related to
Cuba.
3. This document contains information affecting the national
defense of the United States within the meaning of the Espionage
Laws (Section 793 and 795, title 18, U.S.C.). Its transmission
or revelation of the contents thereof in any manner to an
unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
4. Reproduction of this document in whole or in part without
permission of the Director of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE
is prohibited except as necessary for the preparation of
supporting plans. Distribution will be restricted to those
US government agencies specifically requiring knowledge of
the plan on a "Special Handling - Not Releasable to Foreign
Nationals" basis.
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
TABLE OP CONTENTS
Letter of Promulgation
Title Page
Table of Contents
Distribution List
Basic Plan
Page 1
Page 2
Page 3
Page 4
Page 5
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:
DOT) DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
8
DISTRIBUTION LIST
AGENCY
COPY NUMBERS
Department of State
Department of Defense
♦Department of the Treasury
♦Department of Justice
♦Department of Health, Education and Welfare
♦Department of Agriculture
Central Intelligence Agency
US Information Agency
♦Federal Aviation Agency
♦Bureau of tho Budget
♦Distribution to asterisked agencies will not be made until
such time as their participation is required in planning or
implementation of the plan. When distribution is made to
E?**® fancies, only those portions of the plan which pertain
to their participation wilx be disseminated.
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
UNITED STATES CONTINGENCY PLAN NO. 2, CUBA (S)
Reference: Memorandum for Representatives of State, Defense,
CIA and USIA, from Chief of Operations,. Operation
MONGOOSE, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in Cuba,
Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962.
Task Agencies : Department of State
Department of Defense
Central Intelligence Agency
US Information Agency
1. Situation .
a. The' purpose of this plan is to define the courses of
action to be pursued by affected agencies of the US
Government in the event that a decision is made that
the United States undertake military intervention in
Cuba.
b. The assumed situation in Cuba is open, wide-
spread revolt. This contingency may be a non-US
initiated situation, similar to that rumored as being
activated for mid-June 1962. US actions to exploit
the situation include the use of US military force.
c. It is assumed that this plan would be implemented
under the following conditions, and would be considered
for implementation under situations less severe. An
Internal revolt has created a chaotic situation in
Cuba where:
(l) The revolution is open and threatens
the Communist regime;
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING:
DOD I'lR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
(2) Areas are taken and held by the revolutionaries,
and;
(3) Leadership of the revolt, unable to overthrow $
the government or sustain the revolution indefinitely,
requests assistance from the United States and/or the
• y
Organization of American States (OAS).
d. The United States may, or may not, be able to determine
that a rebellion is Imminent before actual outbreak.
However, it is unlikely that the assumed situation will
occur all at once and without notice. More probably it will
evolve from a localized revolt which will provide some
advance notice and the opportunity to initiate necessary
diplomatic, propaganda, covert and military preparations.
e. The strength, morale, disposition and equipage of
unfriendly forces will be assumed to be as described in
current estimates of the United States Intelligence Board
(USIB) .
2. Mission.
The United States will support and sustain the rebellion
in Cuba through all its resources including the use of US
military force to assure replacement of the Communist regime
with a new Cuban government acceptable to the United States.
3. Execution.
a. Concept of Operations .
(1) When the likelihood or emergence of a Cuban
revolt becomes apparent to the US intelligence community
it will be immediately brought to the attention of the
3412 Special Group (Augmented) through the Office of
the Chief of Operations, Operation MONGOOSE. Evaluation
of the situation by the Specirl Group will determine whether
~ wl LUinL iinnuLiiiij^ nurunn
I V I
or not the Presidents decision should be sought to
implement this plan.
(2) The initial stages of a spontaneous revolt will
be supported by the United States through propaganda,
covert operations and other actions as necessary, but
maintaining the appearance of non-US involvement should
1 /
the revolt fail. In the event that tte revolt spreads
as a popular movement against the Communist regime, the
United States should be capable of rapid military action
to forestall a concerted aid drastic reprisal program in
the interest of humanity and the mission of this plan.
(3) US Military Reaction.
(a) With no prior warning and with eighteen (18)
days of preparation a coordinated airborne-amphibious
assault could be executed which, it is anticipated,
would gain control of key military installations and
the principal centers of population of Cuba within
ten (10) days and result in minimum US and Cuban
casualties.
(b) A requirement to reduce significantly the pre-
assault period would necessitate incremental commit-
ment of US forces as they could be assembled and em-
ployed. Under this circumstance the time required to
gain essential US military control of Cuba could be
appreciably extended. However, reduction of US mili-
tary reaction time may be of overriding importance.
In such case, air and naval forces could attack in
support of the rebel Cubans with little delay from
the time a decision, is pade. An air assault
could be initiated within eight (8) hours, an
airborne assault could- be initiated within five
(5) days and a Navy/Marine amphibious . force •
could be committed three (3) days later with
12
\
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962 )
■' TOP SEC R ET SP E CIAL— tffrWtfWfi — WWi
a build up to the full-scale effort to follow.
(4) Execution of this plan will be in two (2) phases:
(a) Phase I. After Presidential decision, this
phase will be undertaken by the Department of Defense
supported by other agencies of the government. It
will be initiated by overt US military assault on
Cuba under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
and will be terminated at such time as essential
military control is gained over the island. The
operation is to be conducted as rapidly as possible,
quickly to confront Cuban forces with sufficient
strength to be clearly beyond enemy capability to
M V
resist and to reduce risk to US units initially
deployed, with a view toward early capitulation of
Cuban military units and avoidance of needless loss
of life.
(b) Phase II. Following the establishment of
essential US military control of the island, this
phase will be primarily concerned with the restora-
tion of law and order and the establishment of a new
Cuban government friendly to the US.. US military
efforts will be directed primarily to matters of civil
affairs and military government in accordance with
policy established by the Department of State. Mili-
tary operations essential for the. elimination of
small pockets of resistance and restoration of law
and order throughout the island will continue. Major
US combat forces will be withdrawn as early as
security may permit. Operational responsibility of
the Department of Defense will cease at the time the
f
Department of State assumes responsibility for civil
administration of Cuba.
I p • fl ■? 1 "
(1) When directed by higher authority, or as the
situation demands, the Department of Defense ;vill
initiate preparatory actions for OS military inter-
vention in Cuba. These actions may include pre-
positioning forces and equipment by execution of
current cover and deception plans.
(2) Upon final decision of the President, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff will direct execution of military
intervention plans for Cuba.
(3) In concept, initial military operations commence
with a blockade, concentrated air strikes and coordi-
nated Naval gunfire to effect destruction of enemy
air power and to neutralize and destroy as much as
possible of the enemy tank, armor, artillery, and
anti-air capability.
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)
111.
(5) At such time as essential US military control
is gained in Cuba, matters of civil affairs and mili-
tary government will be given priority and undertaken
in accordance with policy established by the Department
of State. This includes provision for a provisional
military government prepared to assume full legislative,
executive, and judicial control until such functions
can be turned over to other authority on direction in
an expeditious and orderly manner. Remaining resistance
•
elements of the Communist Cuban government, armed forces
or other groups will be isolated, contained and destroyed
or captured as rapidly as possible. US military combat
units will be scheduled for early re.tum to the United
States consistent with security considerations,
c. Department of State Operations .
(1) Phase I. The Department of State will seek to
place the United States in as broad a multilateral
context as possible.
(a) Immediately sound out Latin American
Governments to determine whether the United States
can count upon a 2/3 majority decision authorizing
the use of military forces under Article 6 of
the Rio Treaty.
V
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)
-W-StMt- S P EC I AL i l flNDLINC NI HW-
■ ■ntf
H4rir:i
V
l
[
(b) If 2/3 majority is available, request the
Council of the Organization of American States to
convoke immediately a meeting of foreign ministers
under Article 6 of the Rio Treaty and obtain Organi-
zation of American States (OAS) decision authorizing
use of force.
(c) Seek agreement from at least two Latin
American nations (preferebly not Nicaragua or Guate-
mala) to provide token forces to join United States
forces.
(d) If 2/3 majority cannot be mustered, recognize
the anti-Castro forces as the Government of Cuba and,
in response to its appeal for help, come to its
assistance with United States military forces and
whatever foreign token forces have been made available
(e) Keep key members of Congress informed of
significant developments.
(f) Inform all friendly governments of our actions
and the reasons therefor; obtain public expressions
of their support and of their sympathy for the anti-
Castro forces. Warn them to expect communist directed
violence and offer them assistance.
(g) Notify the OAS and the United Nations (as
appropriate) of our actions and be prepared to defend
them in these international bodies.
(h) Engage in all-out psychological warfare and
propaganda stressing the morality of United States
action designed to assist the Cuban people throw off
the bonds of communist enslavement.
(2) Phase II - (root invasli-s '
(a) Provide immac". - omevsevicy economic and
other assistance to tb- uopulace.
i
Villi
(b) Turn over as rapidly as possible to the Cuban
Government for administration of the territory taken
by United States troops and assist that government
to the extent feasible as it requests,
(c) Make preparations to provide the Cuban Govern-
ment with long range economic assistance.
(d) Take measures to assist the Cuban Government
to control entry into and exit from Cuba.
(e) Re-establish the United States country team
in Havana.
d. Centra
icy Oi
.ons.
(1) CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by a
component of CIA Headquarters, Washington. Operational
elements are located in the vicinity of Miami, Florida,
with sub elements at other Florida locations.
(2) In the event of localized revolt, CIA will give
covert support to the revolt through introduction of
communications, arms, equipment and trained personnel as
appropriate and feasible.
(3) '•'/hen US Military intervention is directed and
contingency plans are implemented, CIA will fully support
the military actions in accordance with the JCS/CIA
Command Relationship Agreement, whether it is implemented
or not.
W Liaison and communications will be established
prior to implementation of CINCLANT and subordinate jtas.
(5) CIA will support military operations by clandes-
tine intelligence, counter intelligence, propaganda,
political and paramilitary operations.
(6) After the initial assault and during the subse-
quent consolidation and occupation phase, CIA will
designate selected personnel from CIA Headquarters and/
or CIA operations base, Florida, to proceed to Cuba and
conduct clandestine operations in support of US forces
and objectives. Ultimately, the bulk of CIA Florida
based personnel will be transferred to Cuba to establish
a permanent CIA station and bases. fi&IAI
min
i
ll r»i
r
I
(1) The Agency will provide complete, but strictly
factual and impartial informational coverage to a spon-
taneous revolt in its initial phase. The purpose of
such coverage will be to keep the people of Cuba, and
of the hemisphere, fully informed of developments, and
to set the stage for possible subsequent courses of
action. Extreme caution will be taken to avoid the
appearance of US involvement during this phase so as to
nullify possible later charges of US intervention (by
Cuba or other Latin American governments) should the
revolt fail. In this context, the Agency during this
phase must carefully refrain from a type or tone of
coverage that might be construed as incitement to riot.
(2) In the event of direct US involvement, the Agency
wills
(a) Assign informational specialists to work with
Defense Psywar units during combat operations.
(b) Staff up a regular USIS unit to move into
Havana with the Department of State contingent at
the time and place to be decided on by the Department.
(c) Prepare for immediate shipment all physical
equipment and resources necessary to support a USIS
operation in Cuba.
(3) Basic considerations in Agency informational
support of direct US military action:
(a) Medium wave radio should receive priority
attention for any overt combat operation in Cuba.
Immediately upon securing any beachhead or other
enclave on the islr;.id, and perhaps immediately prior
to or concurrent v.'.Vh such action, massive medium wave
broadcasting should begin. A beefed-up Guantanamo
transmitter, leased U.S. Florida facilities, floating
transmitters and, as soon as possible, captured Cuban
station(s) should be assigned to this task. Short
wave facilities will also be increased to provide
necessary backup.
(b) The messages of this initial phase should be
simple and direct, reassuring the people of their
personal safety and the protection of their individual
rights, instructions on the maintenance of public
order, the distribution of food and medical attention,
all done hopefully in a Cuban context and with only
the minimum of reference to US military forces and
pov/er necessary to maintain order and to assure
credibility of the inevitability of Castro's rapid
and complete defeat.
(c) Care must be exercised, particularly with the
anti-Castro Cubans, to aroid alienating possible sup-
port by immediate talk of vengeance, or of indications
of possible loss of any gains (housing, land, social
benefits) which might have accrued to the peasant and
worker groups during the Castro regime.
(d) Given the relatively high rate of literacy
in Cuba, wall posters and leaflets reiterating the
themes of the broadcasts should also be available
and utilized as soon as practical, the leaflets by
air drop ahead of military action where deemed
advisable.
(e) Any provisional military government must also
have a nev/s bulletin for factual news summaries and
instructions to the civilian population.
(f) "n all psy~ v ological planning, special atten-
tion should be giv-n to avoiding in so far as possible
19
I
>1 '
any indications of plans to return to the status quo
ante, all information output should be designed to
reassure the populace that the US supported movement
is designed to carry forward the realization of the
social and economic aspirations of the Cuban people,
f. Department of the Treasur
Department of Justice
Department of Agriculture
Supporting functions will be undertaken to assist
expedite and promote the efforts of Task Agencies:
a. As requested by Task Agencies, prior to
plan implementation, and
b. As requested by Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, when plan is implemented.
oord
a. Implementation of this plan will be as directed by
the President.
b. Military operations, including clandestine and para-
military activities, will be conducted by CINCLANT as
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration
of military government activities in Cuba will be conducted
by CINCLANT as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in
accordance with policy established by the Secretary of State.
c. Political, psychological and economic operations will
be accomplished in accordance with policy established by
the Secretary of State.
d - Supporting^ plans are requi red from all Task Agencies.
Direct coordination between agencies should be^ effected for
planning purposes. One copy of supporting plans is to be
provided Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose, and
maintained in current status.
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff - 27 July 1962)
■ « I »■ ■ ■ 1 II
Ikiniim
(Amended
e. During implementation of the plan the Chief of
Operations, Operation Mongoose, will act as the coordinator
for the 5^12 Special Group (Augmented) on inter-Agency
activities. The coordinating office will be established
in the Pentagon, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Room 2 B 913, telephone extension 59710.
as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- 27 July 1962)
PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff , on 22 May 1962 approved
CINCLANT Operational Plan 318-62* which provides cover for
US preparations for military intervention in Cuba.
2. Planning for US military intervention in Cuba with
a reaction time reduced to five (5) days is currently in
process but ha3 not been approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.**
3. CIA operations against Cuba are controlled by Commander,
Task Force "W" which is a component of CIA Headquarters in
Washington, D.C. The primary operational element is the
CIA unit located in the vicinity of Miami, with sub elements
at other Florida locations CIA will support the military
operation in the event US military action is taken against
Cuba.
Sub -paragraphs of the execution paragraph of the basic
plan, outlining separate departmental and agency participation,
were provided by the agency concerned.
* CINCLANT Operations Plan No 3 18-62: on fiie in Joint
Secretariat
** CINCLANT Operations Plan No 316-62: on file in Joint
Secretariat
Enclosure B
'll
ENCLOSURE C
DISCUSSION
!• approved military plan for US intervention in Cuba
can be executed in eighteen ( 18 ) days from a condition of
no warning. It is not anticipated that funds will be
expended nor units pre-positioned to reduce this reaction
time, unless, of course, such preparatory measures can be
clearly related to imminent military action. Extensive troop
training at this time for a Cuban operation which may not be
executed within the next few years is of questionable value.
Similarly, prestockage of supplies, pre-positioning of forces
and activation of ships from the reserve fleet does not
appear justified if such preparations have no likelihood of
being required in the foreseeable future.
2. It is unlikely that a spontaneous uprising in Cuba could
develop and sustain itself for an appreciable length of time
without active and positive US military sppport. It is
expected that the United States would maintain an appearance
of non- involvement prior to any decision to intervene. It Is
therefore important that US forces be capable of more rapid
response than eighteen (18) days, first, to sustain a revolt
and, second, to react adequately to irrational acts or
reprisals by the Communist Cuban government.
3. Although there are increased risks involved in commit-
ting US forces in incremental deployments such risks may have
to be faced. The most rapid reaction possible would be to
employ air power, which is currently being planned by CINCLANT
as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This air plan could
be the difference between success or failure of any popular
uprising in Cuba. The use of air power should be followed
as rapidly as possible by the air-dropped/air-landed assault
as planned in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-62, with follow-on amphibious
forces introduced as soon as feasible, and a build up to the
full-scale effort of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61.
13 June 1962
•» •
nA<M
Declalon on:
JCS 1969/36 6
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUED;
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONAL
I
At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative
to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9 'of
the subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A
by.:
a. Substitution, in the second sentence of
paragraph 2, of the words "urgency for" for the words
"complexity of" and deletion of the words "and increase
the risk of Soviet retaliation elsewhere." from the end
of the sentence. Additionally, paragraph 2 is
redesignated as paragraph 3-
'
b. Deletion of paragraph 3.
c. Deletion of the word "However" from the beginning
of the first sentence of paragraph 4 and of the words
"in the face of increased risk of Soviet countermeasures
elsewhere." from the end of the sentence. Additionally,
all of the last sentence of paragraph 4 is deleted and
the paragraph is redesignated as paragraph 2.
CUSSIr iC/wiCji
Copy to:
M.
Colonel, USAP
Deputy Secretary
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
Qeneral Craig
SJ,5l?r 3&!.J V '•
v«4
NOT RELEASABLE TO l uaui-K
nronrT-
13 June 1962
Decision on:
JCS 1969/366
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
At their meeting on 13 June 1962 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved the recommendations of BGEN Craig as
set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper, as amended
in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:
a. Changes to paragraph 2 and redesignation
as paragraph 3.
b. Deletion of paragraph 3.
c. Changes to paragraph 4 and redesignation
as paragraph 2.
Deputy Secretary
Copy to:
General Craig
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
nurunn
iur ocunti ortuiHL nAMJLIir
12 June 1962
COPY NO / OP COPIES
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA (S)
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
artllflL HANUL IN* ' — ItttttJKN
SOVIET BASE IN CUBA (-S)
PROBLEM
1. In response to a request* from Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, to determine an appropriate course of action
for the United States to take in event that the Soviets establish
a military base in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. The problem stated above was initially posed by Mr. Robert
Kennedy at the meeting of the Special Group (Augmented) on
22 March 1962.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, noting the increased
complexities attending the delay of US intervention in Cuba,
have previously recommended** that a national policy of early
military intervention be adopted by the United States which
should be undertaken as soon as possible and proferably
before the release of National Guard and Reserve forces on
active duty.
4. US military intervention will be required to assure the
final and successful overthrow of the Communist Cuban
government . ***
DISCUSSION
5. For discussion see Enclosure B.
CONCLUSIONS
6. The United States cannot tolerate the permanent existence
of a communist government in Cuba.
7. Military intervention by the United States will be x-cquired
to overthrow the Communist Cuban regime.
* Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) from Brig. Gen.
Lansdale. subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation
Mongoose", dated 8 June 1962, on file in Gen. Craig's office.
** JCS 1962/335 „ , .
*** "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose", dated 14 March 1962,
on file in Gen. Craig's office.
8. The establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba will increase
the complexity of US military action in Cuba and increase
the risk of Soviet countermeasures elsewhere.
RECOMMENDATIONS
9 . It is recommended that:
a. The Memorandum at Enclosure A, with its Appendix
which reflects the above conclusions, be forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense for approval in order that the
Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented) may be
tabled at the meeting scheduled for 14 June 1962.
b. Thi3 paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
nanuuir^ nrmrttfh
ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)
1. Reference is made to Memorandum for the Special Group
(Augmented) from Brig. Gen. Lansdale, subject: "Status of
Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This
memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies
having membership in the Special Group concerning the appropriate
course of action for the United States to take in the event
the Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the
attached memorandum as the position of the Department of
Defense.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
L. L. LEMN1TZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
EXCi&ded from CDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
UNCLASSIHW Enciosure a
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)
1. In response to a Memorandum for the Special Group (Augmented)
from Director of Operations, Operation Mongoose, subject: "Status
of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose," dated 8 June 1962, the
Department of Defense has considered the problem of an appropriate
course of action for the United States to take in event that the
Soviets should establish a military base in Cuba.
2. In the event that a Soviet base is established on the island,
the choice of US counteraction is between long term acceptance of
a communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military
threat to the United States from the South, or US military inter-
vention. It i3 considered that the latter course of action would
be the only solution compatible with the security interests of
the United States.
3. It is believed that military intervention by United States
forces will be required to successfully overthrow the Communist
Cuban regime. Establishment of a Soviet Base in Cuba would
increase the urgency for US military action in Cuba.
KCLUDfO 5*°*
Gt>*
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
Appendix to
Enclosure A
(Page revised as directed by the JCS, 13 June 1962)
.11. oLunt. i or loihl nflnULIN’h NUHJKN
ENCLOSURE B
DISCUSSION
1. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence
of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The present
regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of operations
for espionage, sabotage and subversion against Latin America.
The stability of some governments in Latin America is already
threatened by the overt and covert actions of the Cuban
government. Continued existence of this communist government
increases the probability that one or more other nations in
Latin America will become communist or communist dominated. This
will greatly increase the problems currently facing the United
States and the Organization of American States. While considered
unlikely, it is possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish
military bases in Cuba similar to US installations around
the bloc periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase
US defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet
the threat.*
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.
They are provided with the opportunity to continue with
their subversion efforts in Latin America. Increasing
internal security measures by police state methods decrease
the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The
steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the
resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military
intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure
control of the government and the island. The continuing
indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus
for a communist underground after the elimination of the present
government. This creates a problem for the future which is
steadily increasing in magnitude.*
* JCS 1969/335
clo
1 1 m
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING
DOD DIRECTIVE 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
iui oLunLi iirLuiHL nnnuLin
nurunn
3. There is nothing to prevent the Soviets from eventually
establishing their own base in Cuba. US acceptance of a
Soviet base, or bases, in Cuba might avoid the risk of Soviet
retaliation to US military action but such acceptance would
also generate a greater eventual risk to the United States
from the improved Soviet general war posture.
2
Enclosure B
copy
designation as
m of th
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consid
eration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretar
on file in Joint Secretariat
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOS S NOT APPLY
EXCLUDED FROM CDS
‘i
COP
Y NO.
miAL njinuuuti
,v_. i ur atUKti
TrtE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
13 June 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
*s.
Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S)
(Augmented) from Brigadier General Lansdale, subject: "Status
of Requested Studies, Operation Mongoose", dated 8 June. This
memorandum requested the opinion of all participating agencies
having membership in the Special Group concerning the appropriate
course of action for the United States to take in the event the
Soviets establish a military base in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend approval of the
attached memorandum as the position of the Department of
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff
L. L. LEMNITZER /
Chairman /
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SYSTEMATICALLY
BYJCS CN ™
AUSSIflCATICK
EXCLUDED FROM GOS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
RECRADIKC; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES MOT APPLY
I u s
ULUKUE
v/i uumk iiniiubii
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SPECIAL GROUP (AUGMENTED)
Subject: Soviet Base in Cuba (S) ‘ ' :
1. In response to a memorandum for the Special Group .
(Augmented) from the Director of Operations, Operation
Mongoose, subject: "Status of Requested Studies, Operation
Mongoose", datec^8 June 1962, the Department of Defense has
'K
considered the problem of an appropriate course of action
for the United States to take in event that the Soviets
should take steps to establish a military base in Cuba.
2. In the event of such a contingency, the choice of
US counteraction is between long term acceptance of a
communist state in the Caribbean with an increasing military
threat to the United States from the South or US military
intervention. Our present view is that the latter course
•
of action would be the only solution compatible with the
security interests of the United States.
EXCLUDED FROM CDS
-m-mm
COP'
BUTTON
CLASSIFIC
CONTI!
p° '
: ' * ‘‘'f -ft
\^r r J
mmy . ■
.
* • . '
. « . r ‘ • f • .
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF
NORTHWOODS
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consid
' i’afiafis wAt:
> * . r -A.:. i- ■ • - v -
eration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
BLOUIN
INGELIDO
Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat
excluded FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
JCS 1969/347
2 Hav 1Q62
COPY NO
SPECIAL
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENT AT IVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
MAR JT IKS SUPPORT. O PERATION MONGOOSE fTSl
CS6WG
CONTROL ~/3 7
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
1
EXCLUDED FKOM CDS
MARITIME SUPPORT, OPERATION MONGOOSE (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. To respond to a request by the Secretary of Defense for
a report on ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high
speed boats out of action.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2 . On Ik March 1962, the Secretary of Defense requested*
a report on ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high
speed boats out of action.
3. On 16 March 1962 , the Chief of Naval Operations was
requested to subnit a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff**
on ways of putting Cuban PT boats out of action.
4. On 3 April 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff informed the
Secretary of Defense that the Navy was studying means to put
the Cuban PT boats out of action. and that report
would be submitted when the study was completed.***
5. On 26 April 1962, the Chief of Naval Operations submitted
the requested report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.**** Copy
attached (Appendix to Enclosure).
CONCLUSION
6 . The Memorandum, Enclosure, for the Secretary of Defense,
together with its Appendix, is an appropriate response to the
request from the Secretary of Defense for possible ways of
putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats out of
action.
RECOMMENDATIONS
7- It is recommended that*
a. The Enclosure, together with its Appendix, which
reflects the above conclusion, be approved and forwarded
to the Secretary of Defense.
♦Memorandum on file in General Craig's office
**CM 610-62 dtd 16 Mar 1962 B on ice.
*** JCS 1969/325
****0n file in General Craig's office.
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
3
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Maritime Support, Operation Mongoose (TS)
!• In response to your question* of whether there is some
way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats
out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of Naval
Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
is forwarded for your information.
2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible covert/
clandestine ways and means of putting the Cuban PT boats out
of action but states in substance that none can be covertly
executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more
information is obtained on the degree of security protection
afforded the boats and a pattern of operations has been
established.
3. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities
of the Cuban FT's and will recommend appropriate means to
dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.
♦Memorandum on file in Brig General Craig's office. EXCIUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
a •
Enclosure
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE
DEPARTMENT OP THE NAVY
OFFICE OP THE CHIEF OP NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
In reply refer to
0P605F/br
Ser 000374P60
April 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject: Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)
References: a. CM 610-62 of 16 Mar 1962
b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60
of 20 Mar 1962
1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to
provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime
support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban
high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain
data on PT craft and specified maritime support.
2. The Cuban PT's are fast (up to 45 knots), highly maneuver-
able, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm
(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from
12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war
*
operations these boats would be put out of action quickly,
although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to
protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were
eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would
be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfire and surface ship gunfire.
3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban
PT's. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana,
offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight
boats are presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered
in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are
expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way
to put these boats out of action while they are in port is by
means of agents or swimmer (UDT type) sabotage. Operations
5
Appendix to Enclosure
within harbors to put these PT's out cf action are risky
in that there is a probability that agents/swimmers would be
captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After
the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will
be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them out-
side of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with
less risk should become practical after their pattern of
operations is established.
4. Possible covert/clandeatine ways and means of putting
Cuban PT craft out of action include the following:
\
Appendix to Enclosure
m lain
5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy
or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly
executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more
information is obtained on the degree of thei-r security
protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can
quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue
to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT's and will
recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an
opportunity is presented.
/s/ George W.
GEORGE W.
Anderson
ANDERSON
ppe^dix to Enclosure
‘ wmz
° T r>_: c 4 r “ tq ponn^v-i
8 August 1962
Decision on:
I
JCS 1969/392
(N0RTHV00D3) (S)
At their meeting on 8 August 1962 the Joint Chiefs of
1 9
1 *1
V* *
Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative
for Operation Mongoose as set forth in paragraph 7 of the '
subject paper, as amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:
a. Substitution, in the heading of paragraph 2 on
page 5 , of the word "Requirements" for the word "Cost".
b. Insertion, in subparagraph 2 a on page 5*. of the
words "key strategic areas in" after the words "seize
control of".
c. Substitution, in the first sentence of
subparagraph 3 c on page 6, of the words "were originally"
for the word "are" as well as the addition of the words
"prior to D-day" at the end of that sentence. Additionally,
deletion of the last sentence of that subparagraph.
d. Changing the end of the first sentence of
paragraph 4 on page 6 so as to read:- "....achieving
control of key strategic areas of Cuba within 10-15 days.
Further, in the second sentence of the same paragraph,
the word "such" is substituted for the word "essential"
SVSTEMARI^RE^D <?J_ SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;
“ N0T releasable to foreign nationals
mm
- 1 -
CCIUOEO f*OM cos
CopytoTaenerSi Harris
r_A^_copios each
3 series-
-TOLiHM-*
‘’V ' • )
»vi*Nvi .
»»»»»
//•V
— ?
»Wa.!
NOT
(Bee on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)
£• Changing subparagraph 4 b on page 7 by:
( 1 ) Deletion, in the first sentence, of the
word "only".
( 2 ) Insertion of a new second sentence to
read as follows:- "There may be a requirement for
amphibious lift for rapid redeployment and counter-
guerrilla activities until order has been restored."
(3) Substitution, in the present second
sentence, of the words "30 to 45" for the words
"approximately 20 ".
-• ^wtlon, at the beginning of the first sentence
of subparagraph 4 o on page 7 of the words "it is estimated
that the".
&. Deletion, in subparagraph 4 d on page 7 , of all
after the words "would be fully committed".
h. Deletion, in the second sentence of subparagraph 5 c
on page 8 , of all after the words "targets in Florida". /
Deleti °n, in the last sentence of subparagraph 5 d
on page 8 , of all after the «orda "oonatantly Increasing
capabilities".
ffiWSSjHB
8 Augua
, T t°i#E'GN NATIONALS
- 2 -
‘IfltliLING REQUIRED;
NOT RL LEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
SPECIAL NAKuUNG REQUIRED;
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
8 August 1962
(Dec on JCS 1969/392 - Contd)
j_. Changing the end of the first sentence of
subparagraph 6 c on page 9 ao to reads- "....wil
consist of substantial Array follow-on forces with
such other sea and air support as may be required."
Copy to:
General Harris
- 3 SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED;
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIOF
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 29. D.C.
(ft
l<li 7
SYsimmcAuv emu™ ,
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF
SubJectV,^ JCS 1969/392 - The Consequences of US Military
Intervention in Cuba (TS)
i ft- *■» . J*'
.33
-Mil
•1
■
!
.. it 11
-VS?:
1 . I have reviewed the subject paper and recommend the
following changes be made in order to amplify selected -
paragraphs therein as requested by Mr. Qilpatric on • .
6 August 1962s • »
a- Page 7, paragraph 4 d - add new last sentenoe
a o follows:
"To replace the airborne troop drop capability
. represented by 14 Air Reserve squadrons, it- will be
necessary to degrade theater airlift capabilities
to the following extent for approximately 15 days:
• • •
" (1) Loss of 93# of PACAF total airlift and
15# of USAPE airlift; or
"(2) Loss of 100# of USAFE airlift and 50# of
PACAF airlift; or
"(3) Loss of 70# of PACAP airlift and 50#
of USAFE airlift."
b « Page 15, paragraph 4 • change to read as follows:
"4. Effect on W orld-Wide Ability to React - The
strength or tne Cuban opposition and the resultant
length of the operation will determine the total effect
upon the US capability to react elsewhere. When the
assault forces hav e been committed to the Cuban" ooeration,
•cne strategic Amy forces in CONUS wouId~be* 'short the
supporting forces such as engineer, medical, military •
police, signal and h elicopter units fox* the remaining
live divisions, presuming achievement of . . . it i3
recognized, however, that certain combat and support
elements will have to be retained in Cuba for counter-
gucrrilla and military government operations*. and
that-englneep y -meaieal y -»i:±itas»y-pellee r -BJrgnai-and
. eivil-affalP8-unitB-wlll-be*requlred-te-Buppopfe-fcheBe
^J-»ilitarjj-gevei»ttaeHfe-eperatien8T These support
TOP SECRET-NUFUKN I gds * *
OPEOlAMIANPLtHr. rlmmrn EXCLUDED PROM AUTOMATIC
— ... : . REGRADING; SOD DIR 5200.10
• V. , ' DOES NOT APPLY.
3S
•<«4
•Vo/S
WWJ
c. Page 15, paragraph 4, last line - add new sentence
as 101 I 0 W 8 : —
committed to a Cuban operation. To replace the
airborne troop drop capability represented by 14
Air Reserve squadrons, it will be necessary to degrade
theater airlift capabilities to the following extent
for approximately 15 days:
"a. Loss of 93# of PACAF total airlift and
1556 of USAFE airlift; or
"b. Loss of 100# of USAFE airlift and 50£ of PACAF
airlift; or
"c. Los 3 of 70 # of PACAF airlift and 50# of
USAFE airlift."
The readiness posture of SAC, . . .
HERBERT D. RILEY
Vioe Admiral, USN
Director
TOP W t B —
7 August 1962 'ZWC//
Tentative Decision on:
JCS 1969/392 SPECIAL HANDLIil E,
(horthwoods) NS)T RF LEASABL E T 0 FOfttlr '
"M
; \ia :
On 7 August 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff tentatively
approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative,
Operation Mongoose, as set forth in paragraph 7 of the subject
paper Itself amended in the Appendix to Enclosure A by:
a. Substitution, in the first sentence of
subparagraph 3 a, of the words "in lieu of" for the
words "to obviate the necessity for".
b. The addition, to the end of the first sentence
of subparagraph 3 e, of the words, ", however, CINCLANT
and Headquarters HSAF have been requested to prepare
alternative plans not involving any mobilization."
Further, in the second sentence of subparagraph 3c,
the word "other" is substituted for the word "additional
0 . The insertion, as a new first sentence to
subparagraph 4 a, of the following:- "When the assault
foroes have been committed to the Cuban operation the t
strategic Army forces in the CONUS would be short the
supporting forces for the remaining five divisions."
d. The insertion, in subparagraph 4 d, of the
PIPF\ word "CONUS" before the words "MATS airlift" and the
>1 ILV words ", if mobilized, would be" before the words
"about 30 per centT^H Or fH*TT excluded from cos
SPECIAL HAMS
copy to: General Harris'^
of . ^- copies each
pages sorifls — A
FX?;.
„„ SPECIAL BmW «S|
NOT PF| F.'SARi r to FQR'EiO.\ i .\tjONA' .C
e. The substitution, in subparagraph 6 b of
the word "may" for the word "will" in the first
sentence and the deletion of all of the last two
sentences.
The Marine Corps requested a "hold" on implementation and
indicated that it would phone-vote either (a) its final approval,
or (b) its desire to add to the Enclosure a paragraph delineating
the Commandant, Marine Corps' reservations concerning the draft
memorandum contained in the Appendix to Enclosure A (in this
event, these reservations will be submitted in writing' by
the Marine Corps). It was also agreed that the Joint Staff
should dispatch an appropriate message implementing the action
called for by the revision to the first sentence cf subparagraph 3
of the Appendix to Enclosure A. (NOTE: Subject message was
subsequently dispatched as JCS 5602).
Should the Marine Corps confirm that it desires to
include the Commandant's reservations as cited above, please
reschedule this item as Agenda Item 1 for the Wednesday,
8 August meeting.
SPECIAL HANDLE &
C>ri r to PApTi
r-^r*
t*'ZUf/33f
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
S31
GLA^SiFiC-VTiOU COffltMlED
JCSM- 56 ^- 62 t '
27 July 1962
MEMORANDUM '•FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: United States Contingency Plan No. 2
Cuba (S)
1. As requested In memorandum for representatives of
State, Defense, CIA and USIA from Chief of Operations,
Operation Mongoose, subject: "Spontaneous Revolts in
Cuba, Contingency Planning", dated 14 June 1962, the
attached plan is forwarded for your approval, prior to
delivery to the Chief of Operations, Operation Mongoose.
2. It will be noted that the alternative methods of
military intervention dealt with in this plan take three
principal forms. These are, in descending order of
magnitude :
a. A deliberate, orderly, large-scale operation
capable of confronting the Castro regime with the
prospect of over-powering force.
b. An accelerated initial reaction by lesser
airborne and amphibious forces building up as
feasible to the scale of the primary plan. This
method entails greater risk, longer time to establish
fully effective control and the probability of. greater
casualties on both 3 ides.
0 . An immediate and continuing air attack on Castro
military forces and facilities to support and assist
the revolting forces and to pave the way for subsequent
operations .
3. The above described alternative methods conform
essentially to current CINCLANT plans for contingency
operations in Cuba.
IXCUJDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FH.OM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DGD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
m
’4. This plan was coordinated with the Department of
State dur.ing preparation in order to be consistent with
and complementary to the alternate plan prepared by State
which addresses the contingency of an internal Cuban
revolt but is limited to US actions less than military
intervention.
5. Operations outlined within this plan for the
Department of State, Central Intelligence Agency and
US Information Agency were prepared by each agency
concerned.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff
L. L. LEMNITZER v
Chairman /
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Enclosure
Plan
TOP SECRET SPECIAL" HANDLING HOFORN
*> w »•/ «••*•••
Decision onj
jcs 1969/389
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
«8s=;
2 ? July -1962
mmo
> ay jcs on
—p.
AC their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff approved the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Represent-
ative to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 9
of the subject paper as amended by:
a. . The deletion, from the beginning of the
last sentence of subparagraph 3 b (3) (A) of the
Appendix to Enclosure A, of the words "when relieved
by Army units' 1 .
b. Substitution, in subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d
of the Appendix to Enclosure A, of the word "CINCLANT"
for the words "the designated unified commander".
o_. CSAFM 229-62 itself amended by the withdrawal
of paragraph 1 b.
d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated
27 July 1962 itself amended by revision of the proposed
paragraph 2 o, contained in paragraph 2, so as to readj-
"c. An immediate and continuing air attaok on
Castro military forces and facilities to support and
assist the revolting forces and to pave the way for
subsequent operations"
I
«VNKVv ■>
•••*<• •*- * 4
-» l*XS.4.i
I
*WVM‘
m -*
c-v>*/'rj
1962
Decision on:
jcs 1969/389
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
At their meeting on 27 July 1962 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved the recommendations of BGEN Harris as
set forth in paragraph 9 of the subject paper as amended -
by:
a. A change to subparagraph * 3 b (3) (a) of
the Appendix to Enclosure A.
b. Changes to subparagraphs 4 b and 4 d of the
Appendix to Enclosure A.
£. CSAFM 229-62 Itself amended by the withdrawal
of paragraph 1 b.
d. A Marine Corps Flimsy, this subject, dated
27 July 1962 itself amended in paragraph 2 by changes
to the proposed paragraph 2 c.
S'/STMTICWXP/
wicsori -^- t
CiA. S’i'iC.yhCB
M.U. DJGEKIDO
Colonel, USAF
Secretary
Copy to:
General Harris
EXaUDED fROM CDS
j
THtwIHnBIIOro
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
* .Hr- 'f\
i <*.% .
8 May 1962
Decision on i
JCS 1969/344
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
On 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiers of Staff approved
the recommendations of the DOD/JCS Representative to the
Caribbean Survey Group as set forth In paragraph 11 of the
subject paper.
CU3$!F1CAT10N mkm.
M.
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary
Copy to;
General Craig
EXCLUDED FROM GOS
— nr®®—
„ SKHBWIfc ***■ f ■" "
- Decision om
JCS 1969/3^4
'►FiV
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
On 8 May 1962 the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved
BQEN Craig's recommendations as set forth in paragraph 11
of the subject paper.
M. INGELIDO
Colonel, LEAF
Deputy Secretary
fgOJJDED 005
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
II
JCSM-365-62
8 May 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE • i
! 4 ,
Subject: DOD Task No. 38, Operation MONGOOSE
- 1
1. Pursuant to the requirements set forth in DOD Task
(*• • •
No. 38 the Department of Defense was requested to review
the present arrangements for granting asylum to Cuban
refugees at 'Guantanamo Naval Base, with the view of
granting asylum to all Cubans so desiring it, at the
Naval Base.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the
recommendations outlined in the attached memorandum be
approved .
FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF: '
G. H. DECKER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Occluded from gds
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
. DOES NOT APPLY
3. Some possible Ways of
out of action enumerated a:
4. The Operations Deputies approved the attached memo
for the Secretary of Defense, together with its enclosure,
on 7 May 1962 fcr transmittal to the Secretary of Defense.
It is recommended that you approve and sign the attached
memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, which forwards
the CNO report.
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig. General, USA 0
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
OCCLUDED FROM GDS
MEMORANDUM TOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject: JCS 1969/347 - Maritime Support,
Operation Mongoose (TS)
1. On 14 March 1962, the Secretary of Defense inquired
whether there is some way of putting the Soviet furnished
Cuban PT boats out of action.
2. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense
forwards a memorandum from the Chief of Naval Operations,
which sets forth some possible ways and means of putting
the Cuban PT boats out of action, but states in substance
that it is not practicable to carry out the operations at
this time and that appropriate recommendations will be
submitted at a later date.
v/l
V I
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
8 May 1962
MEMORANDUM for the chairman, joint chiefs of staff
S ubject: DOD Task No. 38 , Operation MONGOOSE
1. In accordance with Task No. 29 the department of
Defense was requested to undertake a review of the present
arrangements for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base for
asylum. The review included all legal, political and
security ^aspects in addition to development of recommenda-
tions on the .^feasibility and desirability of granting
asylum to all Cubans so desiring at Guantanamo Naval Base.
2. The Operations Deputies approved such a document /
responsive to this task on 8 May .1962. It is recommended
that you Approve ana sign the attached memorandum
forwarding the results of this review to the Secretary
of Defense.
WILLIAM if. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
CLASSiF iCATiOM CGmiNUcD. I
EXCLUDED FROM CDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE S
Subject: Maritime Support, Operation ( Mongoose (TS)
1. In response to your question of whether there is some
way of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban high speed boats
out of action, the enclosed memorandum from the Chief of
Naval Operations has been approved by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and is forwarded for your information.
2. The enclosed memorandum sets forth some possible
covert/clandestine ways and means of putting the Cuban PT
boats out of action, but states in substance that none can
be covertly executed in Cuba without undue risk of
exposure until more information is obtained on the degree
of security protection afforded the boats and a pattern
of operations has been established.
3. The Navy will continue to watch closely the activities
of the Cuban PT’s and will recommend appropriate means to
dispose of them when an opportunity is presented.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Q • H. . DECKER
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Enel:
Memo from CNO
SYSTEMATICALLY
BY JCS ON
CLASSiFiCATiGN CGHTiNI
EXCLUDED FROM CDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
RECRADIHG; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
r
DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS
WASHINGTON 25, D.C.
In reply refer to
’ 0P605F/br
Ser 000374P60
2b April: 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE JOINT CHIEFS OP STAFF
Subject: v -Maritime Support, Operation MONGOOSE (TS)
References: a. CM 610-62 of 1 6 Mar 1962
b. CNO memo for the JCS Ser 000314P60
of 20 .Mar 1962
1. Reference a requested the Chief of Naval Operations to
provide specified information on PT type craft, maritime
support needs, and ways of putting the Soviet furnished Cuban
I
high speed boats out of action. Reference b provided certain
.data on PT craft and specified maritime support.
• 2. The Cucan PT's are fast- (up to 45 knots), highly mniifcavei-
able, and possess a credible armament consisting of 4-25 mm
'(twin) guns, 2-21" torpedo tubes (two torpedoes) and from
12-16 depth charges. In overt conventional naval war
operations these boats would be put out of action quickly,
although an anti-PT defense would have to be established to
protect our troop/cargo carrying ships until the PT's were
eliminated. The primary means of destroying PT craft would
be aircraft delivered rocket/gunfirc and surface 3hip gunfire. 1
3. There have been no reports on the operations of the Cuban
PT‘s. They have been delivered by Soviet ships to Havana,
offloaded and sailed under their own power to Mariel. Eight
boats ai'e presently located at Mariel. Four PT's, delivered
in early April, were still in Havana at last report, but are
expected to move to Mariel in the near future. The only way
to put these boats out cf action while they are in port is by
means of agents or swimmer (UDT type) sabotage. Operations
EXCLUDFD FROM GDi
<1
t
w^hm h,r«x>*. to put Shcsa rr = out of action arc ric’.ry
In that there is a probability that a«ont s / O v, iram or 0 would' be
captured with subsequent exposure and US complicity. After
the PT's commence to operate, their pattern of operations will
be studied so as to establish methods to dispose of them out-
side of their harbors. A wider spectrum of actions with
less risk should become practical after their pattern of
operations is established/''
s
Posslbl e covert/clandestine v/ays and means of putting
CUba ^^t° raft ° Ut ° f acfclon lnclude the following:
mi
imiiimri:
ai
« W ■
ML.
5. Although the Navy has ways and means available to destroy
or neutralize the Cuban PT boats, none can be covertly
executed in Cuba without undue risk of exposure until more
information is obtained on the degree of their security
protection. Under conditions of overt warfare, the Navy can
quickly dispose of the Cuban PT's. The Navy will continue
to watch closely the activities of the Cuban PT'c and will
recommend appropriate means to dispose of them when an
opportunity is presented.
/s/ George V»\ Anderson
GEORGE W. ANDERSON
USIti
■■PI
mm
'WmMM.
#@.S
mm
»%Wf -v ‘jA'-’J\
iSSVBm
••>— %■— ‘jjSwy/ w
i»
*;•> '.*; - . v ;^r; ■ V
■^%;|tfe
- •
• x\:.* ....
•• v*
mm
. BLOUIU
If:
IS
m.
RCPROOUCEO AT THE
9 April 1962
COPY NO. OF
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
CUBA (TS)
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
ill
CUBA (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. To develop the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
with reference to two questions posed by General Taylor at
the meeting of the Special Group (5412), 5 April 1962, re-
lated to possible sentences for the invasion prisoners as
follows:
a. Do the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United
States should intervene?
b. Does the United States have the capability to
intervene?
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. Past considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have
been reviewed for opinions or decisions related to General
Taylor's first question. Two studies are appropriate; however,
both studies were directly concerned with the current Cuba
Project (Mongoose).
a. The first study,* dated 8 February 1962:
A significant conclusion of this study states that
the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe the overthrow of the
Communist Cuban Regime can be accomplished without pre-
cipitating general war and without serious effect on world
public opinion if, among other things, the impression is
created that there is on urgent, humanitarian requirement
to restore order in Cuba.
b. The second study,** dated 16 March 1962:
This study repeated the above decision, but further.
* jcs 1969/303
** jcs 1969/313
2
appended a list of circumstances which could be considered
sufficient provocation for US military intervention in Cuba.
One of the situations listed, which depended upon degree of
seriousness, is stated:
"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive attempt
of April 1961."
3. For additional facts bearing see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
4. For discussion see Enclosure C.
CONCLUSIONS
5 . The Secretary of Defense should be advised during the
meeting of 10 April that execution of 100 or more Cuban prison-
ers should be exploited (with pretexts and an expanded propa-
ganda campaign if necessary) by the US as Justification for
intervention.
6 . The Secretary of Defense should be advised that there
is no question of US capability to intervene, and that the
deliberate course of implementing such action within 18 d$ys
after decision is more prudent than the faster but riskier
course of piecemeal force commitments.
7. Inasmuch as the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not addressed
the question of US military intervention in Cuba except within
the context of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that
military action be recommended to the Secretary of Defense and/
or the President as the only course which provides assurance
that the Communist Cuban regime can be removed in the important
time frame of the near future.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8 . It is recommended that:
a. Conclusions 5 and 6 above be reflected as the position
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during -the -mooting 'with the
Secretary of Defense 10 April 1962.
I
b. The memorandum at Enclosure A be forwarded to the
Secretary of Defense to express the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff concerning US military intervention in Cuba outside
the context of Operation Mongoose.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
e. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
r
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem
must be solved in the near future. Further, they see no
prospect of early success in overthrowing the present communist
regime either as a result of internal uprisings or external
political, economic or psychological pressures. Accordingly
they believe that military intervention by the United States
will be required to overthrow the present communist regime.
2. The United States cannot tolerate permanent existence
r v
of a communist government in the Western Hemisphere. The
present regime in Cuba provides communism with a base of
operations for espionage, sabotage and sifcversion against
Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin
America is already threatened by the overt and covert actions
of the Cuban government. Continued existence of this com-
munist government increases the probability that one or '
more other nations in Latin America will become communist
or communist dominated. This will greatly increase the
problems currently facing the United States and the Organiza-
tion of American States. While considered unlikely, it is
possible for the Sino-Soviet Bloc to establish^military
bases in Cuba similar to US installations around the bloc
periphery. Establishment of such bases would increase US
defense costs as forces were developed or shifted to meet
the threat.
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and the communist bloc.
They are provided with the opportunity to continue with
their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing
internal security measures by police state methods decrease
exciuoeo from gd 5
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
(Page revised as directed by the JCS, 10 April ^ 2 ° SUre A
the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. The
steady improvement in military defenses strengthens the
resistance which must be overcome in the event of US military
intervention and could lengthen the time required to secure
control of the government and the island. The continuing
indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a growing nucleus
for a communist underground after the elimination of the present
government. This creates a problem for the future which is
steadily increasing in magnitude.
b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the United States
can undertake military intervention in Cuba without risk of
general war. They also believe that the intervention can be
accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist opportunities
for solicitation of UN action. Forces available would assure
rapid essential military control of Cuba. Continued police
action would be required.
5. In view of the increasing military and subversive threat
to the United States and the nations of the Western Hemisphere
posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend that a national policy of early military intervention
in Cuba be adopted by the United States. They also recommend
that such intervention be undertaken as soon as possible and
preferably before the release of National Guard and Reserve
forces presently on active duty.
, 6 Enclosure A
(Page revised as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 Apr 62
ENCLOSURE B
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. With regard to the question concerning US capability to
intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 will
assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government
within 10 days after forces are committed. As recently as 3
April 1962 CINCLANT (in response to a Joint Chiefs of Staff
query concerning the adequacy of forces in his OPLAN) has
advised that contingencies which could complicate the campaign
against Cuba have been recognized and considered acceptable
hazards. CINCLANT states, ", . . it is my judgment that the
forces in CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61 are adequate to gain essential
control of Cuba within the estimated 10 days. 11 CINCLANT quali-
fies this Judgment to depend on the following:
'a. Intelligence available to this command concerning the
current strength, capabilities, morale, and locations of
Cuban military forces is essentially correct.
"b. The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM
and PACOM is, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less
than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.
"c. Certain of the "on call" army forces now listed in
the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in motion
in time to arrive in the objective area on or before D plus
10 ."
2. While the fastest means of assuring completion of the total
task in Cuba is OPLAN 314-61, the situation may require initial
reaction by the DS in less than 18 days. A calculated risk could
be considered, providing piecemeal commitment of US forces as
rapidly as they and their transportation become available. This
is CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61, and although not approved by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, was returned to CINCLANT for rewrite. Represen-
tative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN 316-61 from a condition
THE NATIONAL ARCHIVES
i
BCPROCAICEO AT
of no warning were:
2 ABN Divisions
4 Marine BLTs
Artillery and Armor
Follow-on Forces
5 days
7-8 days
10-12 days
15-18 days
O
Enclosure B
ENCLOSURE C
DISCUSSION
1. In addition to related considerations of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff, additional factors which support US intervention in
Cuba, if loo or more prisoners are executed, are:
a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mon-
goose, already proved by the Special Group, indicate that..mili
tary intervention must eventually be resorted to for overthrow
of the Communist Cuban regime.
b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.
o. Justification for US Intervention will probably be more
convincing to the rest of the world if it can be related to
a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely on '
manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.
The US could, however, bolster the justification for inter-
vention, if required, to provide a stronger case for US
military action.
d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would
adversely affect the faith and resolution of refugee Cubans
and the Cuban underground In future attempts to resist the
Communist regime, if they, .feel that the US has ignored, l„
apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's
invasion attempt.
2. US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diversionary
tactics in other parts of the world (most probably i„ known
trouble spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the Offshore
Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would likely
engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UN forum
lor pressure against the US. However, the essential and most
important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed.
CINCLANT'S OPLAN states, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining
control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces,
Enclosure C
__IAD_. cron t-T
Ufl tfft'fHI-*'***'
leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and counter-
guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from D-5 therefore, it
should be expected that US forces committed to Cuba will be
unavailable for other contingencies for only about 20 days,
although the Marine Division Wing Team from the West Coast will
be in poor position for immediate redeployment for some time
longer.
3. The fastest means of applying force against Cuba would
be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF) , although
this would be an interim measure until surface forces could be
deployed. This capability, now being prepared by CINCLANT as
a new and separate plan, could be utilized for destruction of
Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces (especially armor),
and disruption of Cuban communications and utility systems.
This plan to be operable in 6 hours in the strength desired by
CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12 Air Force Squadrons in
Florida.
DECISION ON JC
w:;.
m
j 1 JUfiul
1
1
1 ■
iV.
flllKHKml
^ w'3l
j-v •
NOFORN
3 licy 1962
COPY NO.
SPECIAL
OF
^COPIES
'N
™™2 R L? Y THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOIuT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
ESTABLISHMENT OF "PATROL POSTS" (’ll)
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
1
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
CSGWG
CONTROL *
ESTABLISHMENT OP "PATROL POSTS" (U)
THE PROBLEM
1. To respond to a request* from the Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE, to examine the possibility of establishing
"patrol posts" in the Caribbean.
ASSUMPTIONS
2. The term "patrol posts" is assumed to include any agency
or facility which could contribute to an anti -invasion and
Infiltration surveillance system. Such an agency could be
overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bl-national,
or multi-national in nature.
PACTS BEARING ON TOE PROBLEM
3. By memorandum to the DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean
Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962 , the Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE, requested an examination of the possibility
of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean. Particular
attention was to be given to the possibility of such an
establishment, to be purely US, in Haiti, so as to guard against
any Invasion attempt at that country from Cuba.
A. For additional Facts Bearing on the Problem, see
Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
5. For discussion, see Enclosure C.
CONCLUSIONS
6 . Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a
meaningful military Invasion against any Caribbean country
with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti,
the capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using
a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of Cuban
coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability
of the US Atlantic Command. Forces of this command, assisted
by military forces of the country concerned, are capable of
combatting successfully any invasion attempts by Cuba.
*0n file in General Craig's office
7. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-
sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information
of Cuban actions and indications of Intentions. Due to the
nature of the likely Cuban threat, i.e., infiltration and
subversion supporting an indigenous revolutionary movement,
the value of surface "patrol posts" is questionable.
8. Based upon the past experience of the Department of State
in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral agree-
ments with Central American governments to provide assistance
for defense against communist infiltration and subversion, it
is not feasible for the US to sponsor at this time the establish-
ment of arrangements necessary for the "patrol posts" through
bilateral agreements.
9. At the 8th Meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the OAS,
member States collectively took recognition of the threat posed
to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration. One of
the actions taken to combat this threat was the establishment of
a Special Consultative Committee on Security to study the threat
and make recommendations on measures which should be taken to
preserve the peace and security of the hemisphere. It is
possible that this committee may develop a multi-lateral pro-
posal for such action.
10. An early availability of an amphibious training and
staging facility required in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force
elements of the Atlantic Fleet as previously expressed* by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, could assist in the performance of the
functions envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.
RECOMMENDATIONS
11. It is recommended that:
a. The attached memorandum, Enclosure A, together with
its Appendix, which reflects the above conclusions, be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense.
b . This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
O. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to
NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military staff Committee.
I
ENCLOSURE A
rnmmiiv
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Establishment of "Patrol Posts" (U)
It is recommended that the attached memorandum, subject
as above, be approved and forwarded to the Chief of Operations
Operation Mongoose.
Ml
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADE: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
Enclosure A
i
i
i
i
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, OPERATION MONGOOSE
Subject: Establishment of "Patrol Posts" (U)
1. By memorandum to the DOD/JCS Representative, Caribbean
Survey Group, dated 17 April 1962 , the Chief of Operations,
Operation MONGOOSE, requested an examination of the possibility
of establishing "patrol posts" in the Caribbean manned by
personnel from one or several countries. Particular attention
was to be given to the possibility of such an establishment,
to be purely US, in Haiti, so a3 to guard against any invasion
attempt at that country from Cuba. For the purposes of this
examination, "patrol posts" were assumed to be any agency or
facility which could contribute to an anti-invasion and
Infiltration surveillance system. Such an agency could be
overt or covert in nature and could be purely US, bi-national
or multi-national in nature.
2. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a
meaningful military invasion against any Caribbean country,
with the possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti,
the capability is limited to a lightly armed Invasion using
a few aircraft and/or small boats. Surveillance of Cuban
coastal areas and the entire Caribbean is within the capability
of the US Atlantic Command. These forces, assisted by military
forces of the country concerned, are capable of combatting
successfully any Invasion attempts by Cuba. In this respect, the
US through the Ambassador in the Central American Countries,
Colombia and Venezuela, has informed the Presidents of the
respective countries orally that the US was prepared to establish,
upon request of the local government, a system of air-sea
surveillance to assist in seeking out, and interdicting within
national Jurisdiction of the requesting state, attempted landings
of armed forces, agents or supplies by Castro-Communist
elements and otherwise to assist local governments to identify
and frustrate armed assistance to such subversive elements.
This committment was not afforded Haiti.
3. From a military point of view, the primary value of air-
sea "patrol posts", would be in acquiring advance information
of Cuban actions and indications of intentions. Due to the
nature of the likely Cuban threat, i.e., infiltration and
subversion supporting an indigenous revolutionary movement
the value of surface "patrol posts" is questionable.
4. Based upon the past experience of the Department of
State in exploring the possibility of arranging for bilateral
agreements with Central American governments to provide
assistance for defense against communist infiltration and
subversion (aversion to entering into bilateral defense
agreements with the US), it is not feasible for the US to
sponsor at this time the establishment of "patrol posts"
through bilateral agreements.
5. At the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the OAS,
member States collectively took recognition of the threat
posed to the Western Hemisphere by communist infiltration.
One of the actions taken to combat this threat was the
establishment of a Special Consultative Committee on Security
to study the threat and make recommendations on measures which
should be taken to preserve the peace and security of the
hemisphere, it is possible that this committee may develop a
multilateral proposal for such action.
6. By JCSM-5-62,* dated 4 January 1962, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff stated a requirement for an amphibious training and
staging facility in Haiti for use of Fleet Marine Force elements
of the Atlantic Fleet. In reply to the letter from the Deputy
♦On file in Joint. Secretariat
Appendix to
Enclosure A
7
Secretary of Defense, dated 6 March 1962 , which transmitted the
request of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, tne Deputy Under Secretary
of State stated on 20 March I962 that:
"The establishment of military facilities in Haiti
raises a number of basic questions with respect to our
policy toward the present (Duvalier) regime, and requires
most careful consideration."
The Department of State is currently conducting an analysis
of our future policy in regard to the present government of
Haiti. An early availability of a US facility in Haiti,
however, could assist in the performance of the functions
envisioned for a US manned "patrol post" in Haiti.
7 . During this critical period, maximum use will continue
to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB,
MAAGs, Missions, and Attaches) in cooperation, where possible,
with Latin American military forces to perform the functions
envisioned for the "patrol posts." For example, training
operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal patrol activity,
and traffic between that base and US naval installations in
Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea surveillance of eastern
Cuba and the island of Hispaniola including Haiti.
8. In view of the foregoing, it is recommended that no
further action be taken in regard to the establishment of
"patrol posts," PT
8
Appendix to
Enclosure A
L
I
iri
M ■ VI I ■ i
ME
L
ENCLOSURE B
PACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1 . The Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the
American States (OAS) at their eighth meeting* took
cognizance of the threats to the peace and security of the
Western Hemisphere as a result of communist infiltration.
The Council of the OAS (COAS) was requested to "maintain all
necessary vigilance, for the purpose of warning against any
acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace
and security, or the preparation of such acts, resulting from
the continued Intervention of Slno-Sovlet powers in this
hemisphere, and to make recommendations to the governments of
the member states with regard thereto."
2 . As directed by the Foreign Ministers of the OAS at their
eighth meeting, the COAS has established a Special Consultative
Committee of experts on security and has charged this committee
with studying the threat to the hemisphere and recommending to
the COAS measures which should be taken to maintain the peace
and security. This Special Committee Is to autait the initial
report by 1 May 1962 and subsequent reports as available.
General Thomas D. White, USAF^etired, is a member selected
from the United states.
3 . On 10 May 1961, the Department of state by message** to
US Ambassadors of central American countries explored the
possibility of consummating bilateral and later multilateral
agreements with various countries to defend against communist
infiltration and subversion. Responses from addressees
indicated nost governments were not responsive to such
arrangements and opposition could be expected. This
°n P ?“ Join ^Secretariat ClrCUlar 17fi1 ' dated 10 May 6l;
m
Enclosure B
Uilii
i
proposal was discarded and Instead, the US Ambassadors to the
Central American countries were requested by message* on
2 November 1961 , to Inform the Presidents and Foreign Ministers
of host countries orally that the US Government recognized the
Caribbean countries as likely targets of communist subversion or
attack and that it was prepared to establish] upon request of
a local government, a system of air-sea surveillance to assist
in seeking out, and interdicting within the national Juris-
diction of the requesting state, attempted landings of armed
forces, agents or supplies by Castro-Communist elements and
otherwise to assist local governments to identify and frustrate
armed assistance to such subversive elements. In respect to
Haiti, the Department of State stated, "Serious question has
been raised as to whether materiel and other kinds of assistance
against indirect aggression in addition to that already being
made available to the Haitian Government should be given in
present circumstances, particularly because of the apparent
aspiration of President Duvalier to perpetuate himself in
office indefinitely."
4 . On 15 May 1961, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, by memorandum**
to the Secretary of Defense stated, "While it is recognized that
there may be overriding political considerations which dictate
the negotiation of such bilateral and multilateral assistance
agreements, they cannot be recommended from a military
point of view."
* f . S ! a o e me ? : sage - Clrcular CA-388, dated 2 Nov 6l;
on me in Joint Secretariat
** Decision on JCS 1976/365
Enclosure B
I
iMiliJ*
[
ENCLOSURE C
DISCUSSION
1. The communist threat to the Western Hemisphere through
infiltration and subversion was recognized by the Foreign
Ministers of the OAS at their 8th Meeting at Punta del Este and
action was Initiated to find means to combat it. The results
of the COAS Special Committee should provide measures which
could be taken on a collective basis to guard against and
combat the threat.
2. Cuban military forces lack the capability to launch a
meaningful attack against any Latin American country with the
possible exception of Haiti. In the case of Haiti, the
capability is limited to a lightly armed invasion using a few
aircraft and/or small boats.
3. Any invasion of a Caribbean country by Cuban forces would
serve only to further unite the governments of Latin America
and lead to collective OAS action under the terms of the Treaty
of Non-Intervention. Further, a Cuban landing on the territory
of another country could provide a valid justification fol- US
military intervention in Cuba. Any attempt to export communism
from Cuba would be most likely by infiltration and subversion
and would take the form of an indigenous revolutionary move-
ment, supported by arms from Cuba and perhaps Cuban volunteers,
and would be made to appear as an uprising against the incumbent
government.
4. Surveillance of Cuban coastal areas and the entire
Caribbean is within the capability of US aircraft and/or ships
assigned to - the-- Atlantic- Command. Also, US forces and facilities
in the Caribbean are adequate to prevent any invasion of a
Caribbean country by Cuban forces. From a military point of
view, the primary value of -patrol posts" would be in acquiring
advanced information of Cuba's actions and indications of
intentions. The value of ground "patrol posts", even considering
governmental agreements could be effected, is questionable in
view of the nature of the tiireat from Cuba. IIM/ll .. ..
US
clos
i
5. Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider there is little
military justification for establishing multilateral forces for
use in the Caribbean area, the political results of such an effort'
may have some value in gaining further recognition of the threat
and in strengthening national ties between participating countries.
Based upon the past indications from Central American governments
in regard to the negotiation of bilateral assistance agreements,
and the present relations between the US and Cuba, it does not
appear feasible for the US to sponsor a "patrol post" concept in
the Caribbean area at this time. Additionally any consideration
of such a proposal must consider the possible effects on the
treaty with Cuba for the use of Guantanamo Naval Base, if it is
to be used as a "patrol post."
6. In specific regard to a ground "patrol post" in Haiti, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff by memorandum* to the Secretary of Defense,
dated 4 January 1 9 62, stated there was a requirement for an
amphibious training and staging facility in Haiti and requested
that the Department of State, subject to political assessment of
the political considerations involved, make necessary governmental
arrangements for the conduct of surveys and for subsequent
arrangements on specific requirements that are developed. The '
Department of State has Indicated a reluctance to negotiate with
the present Government of Haiti until a thorough analysis is
made with respect to US policy toward the present Duvalier
regime. The early availability of this facility, however, would
meet any requirement for a US "patrol post" in Haiti. In the
meantime, training operations at Guantanamo Naval Base, normal
patrol activity, and traffic between that base and US naval
installations in Puerto Rico provide effective air-sea
surveillance of eastern Cuba and the island of Hispaniola
including Haiti.
7. The most feasible course of action, likely to be acceptable
to the countries concerned, to contend with Cuban infiltration and
subversion of Caribbean countries lies in collective efforts of the
OAS. Past indications from governments of Caribbean countries have
been to the effect that collective OAS efforts and actions are
defensible and rational, whereas unilateral and bilateral actions
case, appropriate consideration of the recommendations for
action, to be submitted by the Special Committee on Security
of the COAS, should provide a basis to accomplish the objective.
8. During this interim period, maximum use should continue
to be made of US forces in the Caribbean area (CINCLANT, CINCARIB,
HAAG'S, Missions, and Attaches) and the Latin American military
forces to perform the functions envisioned for the "patrol
posts. "
9. Any actions to establish "patrol posts" as such in the
Caribbean area would require appropriate "cover" to hide or
obscure the real purpose. While several means are available,
(civilian commercial interests, activities associated with the
Atlantic Missile Range, etc.), the ostensible purpose would
surely invoke strong reaction from the Cuban government and
might jeopardize the over-all security of "Operation Mongoose."
» * • j •
»! ■ ■ ii v.i
JCS 1969/327
(HORTHWOODS) (S)
At their meeting on Z7 March 1962 the Joint
Chief* of Staff noted the aasumptlona which had been agreed
to by the Special Group for Operation MONGOOSE.
BLOOIN
Re ar Admiral ,
Secretary
USN
Copy for:
Craig
SPECIAL HAULING REQUIRES;
NOT RELEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS
bomb 005
April 1962
mm.
Decision on
JCS 1969/327.
(NORTHVOODS) (S)
At their meeting on March 1962 the
joint Chiefs of Staff noted the ehbjeet paper.
• J« BL0U1N
Rear Admiral , USN
Secretary
Copy fori
General Craig
DECLA5W!f?f ED ay.
J0S mumt
GUIDELINES, OPERATION MONGOOSE
The Special Group (Augmented) agreed that planning and
preparations would proceed on the basis of the following
assumptions:
(extracted from Gen Lansdale's copy of the "Guidelines", dated
14 March 1962)
"a. In undertaking to cause the overthrow of the target
government, the United States will make maximum use of
indigenous resources, internal and external, but recognize
that final success will require decisive US military inter-
vention.
"b. Such indigenous resources as are developed will be
used to prepare for and Justify this intervention, and
thereafter to facilitate and support it".
EXCLUDED fROM GDS
*
i%q/3r7
«•
V
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Cuba * ' '
• ;• 4 J '
#’• • »
m • i • #
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban
problem must be solved in the near future. Further, they
see no prospect of early success in overthrowing the present
communist- refine either as a result of internal uprisings-
or external political, economic or psychological pressures.
Accordingly they believe that military intervention by the
United States will be required to overthrow the present
communist regin» .
2- -She United States cannot tolerate permanent existence '
of a communist goveraircnt in the Western Ilerai sphere . The
present regirn in Cuba provides communism with a base of
operations for espionage, sabotage and subversion against
Latin America. The stability of some governments in Latin
Anerica is already threatened by the overt and covert actions
of tho Cuban government. Continued existence of this com-
munist government increases the probability that one or
more other nations in Latin An»rlca will become communist
or communist dominated. This will greatly Increase the
problems currently facing tho United States and the Organisa-
tion of American States. While considered unlikely, it is
possible for the C in o— Soviet Lloo to establish n*ilitary
bases in Cuba similar to U3 installations around tho bloc
periphery. Establishment of such bases would increaso U3
dofenso coots as forces were developed or shifted to neet
the threat.
3. Time favors the Cuban regime and tho communist bloc.
They are provided with the opportunity to continue with '
their subversive efforts in Latin America. Increasing
internal security measures by polico state methods decrease
V
N
)
the possibility of internal uprisings within Cuba. She
steady improvement in military defences strengthens the
resistance which must be overcome in tho event of US
military intervention and could lengthen the time required
to secure control of the government and the Island. The
continuing indoctrination of the Cuban youth creates a
growing nucleus for a conanunl3t underground after the
elimination of the present government. This creates a
problem for the future which is steadily Increasing in
magnitude,
4 . The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that tho United
States can undertake military Intervention in Cuba without
risk of gcreral war. They also boliove that the intervention
can be accomplished rapidly enough to minimize communist
opportunities for solicitation of UN action. Forces
availablo would ascure rapid essential military control of
Cuba. Continued police action would bo required.
5 . In view of the increasing military and subversive
threat to the United States and the nations of the Westorn
Heraicohore posed by the communist regime in Cuba, the Joint •
Chiefs of Staff rccomncnd that a national policy of early
military intervention in Cuba be adopted by the United
States. They also recommend that such intervention be
undertaken as soon as possible and preferably bofore the
release of National Guard and Reserve forces presently
on active duty.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staffs
L. L. LEMNITZBR
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
EXPLANATORY NOTE
One of the requirements which evolved from the JCS Meeting,
6 April, was to up-date JCS 2304/30. That document has been
reviewed and up-dating appears Infeasible for the following
reasons:
a. JCS 2304/30 was written in April 1961 to expand
forces involved In CINCLANT Plan 312-60, from two battle
groups to a force level considered adequate to cope with
the improved Cuban military capability. Force levels are
increased from two battle groups to two divisions plus
a third division in reserve. This plan was overtaken
by CINCLANT OPLAN 314-61, which further increased the
total forces required to the extent that the augmented
Plan 312-60 was superseded'. The plan for Cuba in JCS,
2304/30, therefore, is no longer valid: the plan should
in fact be withdrawn.
b. Much of the related information included in JCS 2304/30
not strictly concerned with the military plan is reflected
in the more current papers published in support of the
Cuban Project (Operation Mongoose).
1969/334
At their nesting on 10 April 1962 the Joint Chelfa of staff
S?« 8 rit J ?Si fc r c SSll 8 ^St^ 1 ?h?J 8 2S2! on Hlth the Secretary
y the
.952, the Joint
EXCLUDED PiM ' AUTOMAT!
RADING
M. J. INGEE/IDO
jcs 1969/334.
9 April 1962
Talking Paper for the Chairman, JCS for the SecDef Meeting,
10 April 1962
Subject: US Intervention in Cuba
Background - At the meeting of the Special Group (augmented) on 5
Apr 62, General Taylor questioned the US course of action in
the event Castro decided to execute about 100 of last April's
invasion prisoners. Inconclusive discussion led General Taylor
to ask. "Suppose Castro decided to shoot them all, what would
we do then?" Mr. Johnson, for State, expressed the opinion that
even this extreme would not provide sufficient justification
for US military action. Mr. Gilpatric, for Defense, and Gen
Parker for the JCS, indicated they felt both the DOD and the JCS
would stand firm for military intervention.
- During the JCS meeting, 6 Apr 62, discussion of
this subject developed two basic questions:
a. Do the JCS believe the US should intervene?
b. Does the US have the capability?
Discussion - Past considerations of the JCS have been reviewed
for opinions or decisions related to General Taylor's first
question. Two studies are appropriate; however, both studies
were directly concerned with the current Cuba Project (Mongoose).
a. JCS 1969/303, 8 Feb 62:
A significant conclusion of this study states that the
JCS believe the overthrow of the Communist Cuban Regime
can be accomplished without precipitating general war and
without serious effect on world public opinion, if, among
other things, the impression is created that there is an
urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba.
b. JCS 1969/313, 16 Mar 62:
This study repeated the above decision, but further,
appended a list of circumstances which could be considered
sufficient provocation for US military intervention in
Cuba. One of the situations listed, which depended upon
degree of seriousness, is stated:
"Execution of prisoners taken in the abortive
attempt of April 1961."
- In addition to these related considerations of the
JCS, additional factors which support US intervention in Cuba,
if 100 or more prisoners are executed, are:
a. Guidelines established for Phase II of Operation Mon-
goose. already approved by the Special Group, indicate that mH
tary intervention must eventually be resorted to for over-
throw of the Communist Cuban Regime.
b. The passage of time favors Castro rather than the US.
c. Justification for US intervention will probably be
more convincing to the rest of the world i'f it can be related
to a real and valid provocation rather than based entirely
on manufactured pretexts which entail some risk of compromise.
1
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
The US could, however, bolster the justification for inter-
vention, if requir ed to provide a stronger case for US
military action.
d. Execution of significant numbers of prisoners would
adversely affect the faith and resolution of refugee Cubans
and the Cuban underground in future attempts to resist the
Communist regime, if they feel that the US has ignored in
apparent disinterest, the final chapter of last year's in-
vasion attempt.
- V/ith regard to the question concerning US capability
to intervene in Cuba, implementation of CINCLANT OP LAN 314-61
will assure forceful and rapid overthrow of the Cuban government
within 10 days after forces are committed; f orces c an be com-
mitted 18 days after the order is given. As recently as 3 Apr
62 CINCLANT (in response to a JCS query concerning the adequacy
of forces in his OP LAN) has advised that contingencies which
could complicate the campaign against Cuba have been recognized
and considered acceptable hazards. CINCLANT states, ". . .it
is my judgment that the forces in CINCLANT OP LAN 314-61 are ade-
quate to gain essential control of Cuba within the estimated
10 days." CINCLANT qualifies this judgment to depend on the
following :
"a. Intelligence available to this command concerning the
current strength, capabilities, morale, and locations of
Cuban military forces is essentially correct.
"b. The amphibious assault lift now available in LANTCOM
and PACOM is, as an absolute minimum, maintained at no less
than present levels and improved and increased as feasible.
"c. Certain of the 'on call' Army forces now listed in
the plan are reclassified as reserve forces and put in
motion in time to arrive in the objective area on or before
D plus 10."
- While the fastest means of assuring completion of .
the total task in Cuba is OPLAN 314-61, the situation may re-
quire initial reaction by the US in less than 1^ gays. A cal-
culated risk could be considered, providing pW i nrim^^ j commit-
ment of US forces as rapidly as they and their transportation
become available. This was proposed in CINCLANT OPLAN 316-61,
and, although not approved by the JCS, was returned to CINCLANT
for rewrite. Representative reaction times, proposed in OPLAN
316-61 from a condition of no warning were:
2 ABN Divisions
4 Marine BLTs
Artillery and Armor
Follow-on Forces
5 days
7-8 days
10-12 days
15-18 days
- The fastest means of applying force against Cuba
would be through the use of US air power (Naval plus USAF) ,
although this would be an interim measure until surface forces
could be deployed. This capability, now being prepared by
CINCLANT as a new and separate plan, could be utilized for
destruction of Cuban air power, reduction of ground forces
(especially armor), and disruption of Cuban communications and
utility systems. This plan to be operable in 6 hours in the
strength desired by CINCLANT will require prepositioning of 12
Air Force Squadrons in Florida.
- US intervention in Cuba could trigger Bloc diver-
sionary tactics. in other parts of the world (most probably in
known trouble spots such as Laos, South Vietnam, Korea, the
2
Offshore Islands, Berlin or possibly the Mid-East) and would
likely engender propaganda campaigns to include use of the UN
forum for pressure against the US. However, an essential and
most important element of the US plan against Cuba is speed.
CINCLANT's OPLAN states, "Some 5 days subsequent to gaining
control, conditions should permit withdrawal of assault forces,
leaving small military units to conduct civil affairs and
counter-guerrilla mop-up operations." Estimating from D-5
therefore, it should be expected that US forces committed to
Cuba will be unavailable for other contingencies for only about
20 days, although the Marine Division Wing Team from the We st
Coast will be in poor position for immediate redeployment for
some time longer.
Recommendations -
a. SECDEF should be advised during the meeting of 10 Apr
that execution of 100 or more Cuban prisoners should be ex-
ploited (with pretexts and an expanded propaganda campaign
if necessary) by the US as justification for intervention.
b. SECDEF should be advised that there is no question of
US capability to intervene, and that the deliberate course
of implementing such action within 18 days after decision
is more prudent than the faster but riskier course of piece-
meal force commitments.
c. Inasmuch as the JCS have not addressed the question
of US military intervention in Cuba except within the context
of Operation Mongoose it appears desirable that military
action be recommended to the SECDEF and/or the President as
the only course which provides assurance that the Communist
Cuban regime can be removed in the important time frame of
the near future.
0plnAQJl-.9?. .tO--g£gOflHPffldatlons :
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group ^Concur) (Nonconcur)
Director, Joint Staff ^Concur) (Nonconcur)
Talking Paper prepared by: Colonel C. S. Seamans, USAF
Contingency Plans Branch, J-5
Extension 59057
in issihwi
3
Decision on
3 April 1962
mm
JCS 1969/326
(HOHPHWOODS) (8)
At their nesting on 3Q March the Joint Chiefs
' i .
of Staff approved the forwarding of a memorandum (CM-626-62)
with attachment to the Secretary of Defense*
Copy fort
General Craig
Rear Admiral, TJSN
Secretary
DECLASSIFIED BY:
J06 DECLASSIFICATION
DATE
BRANCH
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ’■ •
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS) r ; •
13 March 1962
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
• l. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
Memorandum -for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a' Request of that office for brief but precise
description of "pretexts which would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the
proposed memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes. It is assumed that there
will be similar submissions from other agencies and that
these inputs will be used as a basis for developing a
time -phased plan. Individual projects can then be
considered on a case -by-case basis.
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military
and para -military aspects of the basic plan. It is
recommended that this responsibility for both overt and
•covert military operations be assigned the Joint Chieis 01
Staff.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
SYSTEMATICALLY ulKlg
BY JCS ON —J)—-*
CLASSIFICATION CONTI®
L. L. LEMKITZER
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Stl
1 Enclosure
Memo for
Chief of Operations, Cuba Project excluded from gd$
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
Marc
1. At their meeting on 13 March 1962, the Joint
Staff approved the roccmendationn in paragraph 8 i
2. In that the Commandant had expressed direot
• ;•
the Marine Corps in this matter, the provisions of
• — ’ • , ■> .• • « ' ' • j ■ • .
U3 Codo 1U1 (o), applied and were followed.
• : rX/J r>: \
3. Tills deoision now becomes a part of and shai:
ao the. .top shoot of JC3 1969/321.
taohed
r
>
i
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
12 March 1962
Page 2165
i*j 1 r iff rr im ffljiMhMM-r
COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for consider-
ation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Wot reproduced herewith; on file in Joint Secretariat
excluded fsqm gds
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
TOP SECRET
JCS 1969/321
2165
9 March 1962 COPY OF COPIES
SPECinrt)l2TRlfeUTI0N
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE ON THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBA PROJECT (TS^
The Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, has requested
that he be furnished the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on this matter by 13 March 1962.
■ 1 ^ (.1 r« 1 1 1 1
I ■riqillV
JUSTIFICATION FOR US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA (TS)
THE PROBLEM
1. As requested*’ by Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff are to indicate brief but precise
description of pretexts which they consider would provide
Justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
2. It Is recognized that any action which becomes pretext
for US military intervention in Cuba will lead to a political
decision which then would lead to military action.
3. Cognizance has been taken of a suggested course of
action proposed** by the US Navy relating to generated
instances in the Guantanamo area.
4. For additional facts see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
5. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
are based on the premise that US military intervention will
result from a period of heightened US-Cuban tensions which
place the United States in the position of suffering Justif-
iable grievances. World opinion, and the United Nations
forum should be favorably affected by developing the inter-
national Image of the Cuban government as rash and Irresponsible,
and as an alarming and unpredictable threat to the peace of
the Western Hemisphere.
6. While the foregoing premise can be utilized at the
present time it will continue to hold good only as long as
there can be reasonable certainty that US military intervention
in Cuba would not directly involve the Soviet Union. There is
* Memorandum for General Craig from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE", dated
5 March 1962, on file in General Craig's office.
** Memorandum for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, from
Chief of Naval Operations, subjeot: "Instances to
Provoke Military Actions in Cuba (TS)", dated 8 March 1962,
on file in General Craig's office.
1
to the defense of Cuba, Cuba has not yet become a member of the
Warsaw Pact, nor have the Soviets established Soviet bases
in Cuba in the pattern of US bases in Western Europe. Therefore,
since time appears to be an important factor in resolution of
the Cuba problem, all projects are suggested within the time
frame of the next few months.
CONCLUSION
7. The suggested courses of action appended to Enclosure A
satisfactorily respond to the statement of the problem. However,
these suggestions ^should be forwarded as a preliminary submission
suitable for planning purposes, and together with similar inputs
from other agencies, provide a basis for development of a single,
integrated, time-phased plan to focus all efforts on the
objective of justification for US military intervention in Cuba.
RECOMMENDATIONS
8. It is recommended that:
a. Enclosure A together with its attachments should be
forwarded to the Secretary of Defense for approval and
transmittal to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project*
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned
to NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
3
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered the attached
Memorandum for the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project, which
responds to a request* of that office for brief but precise
description of pretexts which would provide justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the proposed
memorandum be forwarded as a preliminary submission suitable
for planning purposes. It is assumed that there will be
similar submissions from other agencies and that these inputs
will be used as a basis for developing a time -phased plan.
Individual projects can then be considered on a case -by -case
basis. .
3. Further, it is assumed that a single agency will be
given the primary responsibility for developing military and
para-military aspects of the basic plan. It is reoomraended
that this responsibility for both overt and covert military *
operation be assigned the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
A
* Memorandum for Gen Craig from Chief of Operations, Cuba
Project, subject, "Operation MONGOOSE", dated 5 March
1962, on file in Gen Craig's office
4 Enclosure A
APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
Subject: Justification for US Military Intervention
in Cuba (TS)
1. Reference is made to memorandum from Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project, for General Craig, subject: "Operation MONGOOSE",
dated 5 March 1962, which requested brief but precise
description of pretexts which the Joint Chiefs of Staff
consider would provide Justification for US military inter-
vention in Cuba.
2. The projects listed in the enclosure hereto are forwarded
as a preliminary submission suitable for planning purposes.
It is assumed that there will be similar submissions from
other agencies and that these inputs will be used as a basis
for developing a time-phased plan. The individual projects
can then be considered on a case -by-case basis. *
y
3. This plan, incorporating projects selected from the
attached suggestions, or from other sources, should be
developed to focus all efforts on a specific ultimate
objective which would provide adequate Justification for
US military intervention. Such a plan would enable a logical
build-up of incidents to be combined with other seemingly
unrelated events to camouflage the ultimate objective and
create the necessary impression of Cuban rashness and
irresponsibility on a large scale, directed at other
countries as well as the United States. The*plan would also
properly integrate and time phase the courses of action to
be pursued. The desired resultant from the execution of
this plan would be to place the United States in the apparent
position of suffering defensible grievances from a rash and
irresponsible government of Cuba and to develop an inter-
national image of a Cuban threat to peace in the Western
Hemisphere.
Appendix to
5 Enclosure A
4. Time is an Important factor In resolution of the Cuban
problem. Therefore, the plan should be so time -phased that
projects would be operable within the next few months.
5. Inasmuch as the ultimate objective is overt military
intervention, it is recommended that primary responsibility
for developing military and para -military aspects of the plan
for both overt and covert military operations be assigned the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
6
Appendix to
Enclosure A
ANNEX TO APPENDIX TO ENCLOSURE A
PRETEXTS TO JUSTIFY US MILITARY INTERVENTION IN CUBA
(Note: The courses of action which follow are a preliminary
submission suitable only for planning purposes. They are
arranged neither chronologically nor in ascending order.
Together with similar inputs from other agencies, they are
intended to provide a point of departure for the development
of a single, integrated, time -phased plan. Such a plan would
permit the evaluation of individual projects within the context
of cumulative, correlated aotions designed to lead inexorably
to the objective of adequate Justification for US military
intervention in Cuba).
1. Since it would seem desirable to use legitimate
provocation as the basis for US military intervention in Cuba
a cover and deception plan, to include requisite preliminary
actions such as has been developed in response to Task 33 c,
could be executed as an initial effort to provoke Cuban
reactions. Harassment plus deceptive actions to convince the
Cubans of imminent Invasion would be emphasized. Our military
posture throughout execution of the plan will allow a rapid
change from exercise to intervention if Cuban response Justifies.
2. A series of well coordinated incidents will be planned
to take place in and around Guantanamo to give genuine
appearance of being done by hostile Cuban forces.
a. Incidents to establish a credible attack (not in
chronological order):
(1) Start rumors (many). Use clandestine radio.
(2) Land friendly Cubans in uniform "over -the -fence"
to stage attack on base.
(3) Capture Cuban (friendly) saboteurs inside the
base.
(4) Start riots near the base main gate (friendly
Cubans ) .
7
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
iwuMi)
(5) Blow up ammunition inside the base; start fires.
(6) Burn aircraft on air base (sabotage).
(7) Lob mortar shells from outside of base into base.
Some damage to installations.
(8) Capture assault teams approaching from the sea
or vicinity of Guantanamo City.
(9) Capture militia group which storms the base.
(10) Sabotage ship in harbor; large fires — napthalene.
(11) Sink ship near harbor entrance. Conduct funerals
for mock -victims (may be lieu of (10)).
b. United States would respond by executing offensive
operations to secure water and power supplies, destroying
artillery and mortar emplacements which threaten the base.
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A "Remember the Maine" incident could be arranged in
several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and
blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere
in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident
in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result
of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence
of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of
the vessel could be fairly compelling evidenoe that the ship
was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago
would add credibility especially to those people that might
have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could
follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US
fighters to "evacuate" remaining members of the non-existent
crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful
wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in
the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
8
haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans
enroute to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts
on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the
extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized.
Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots# the
arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents
substantiating Cuban involvement also would be helpful in
projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
5. A "Cuban -based. Castro-supported" filibuster could be
simulated against a neighboring Caribbean nation (in the vein
of the 14th of June invasion of the Dominican Republic). We
know that Castro is backing subversive efforts clandestinely
against Haiti, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and Nicaragua at
present and possible others. These efforts can be magnified and
additional ones contrived for exposure. For example, advantage
can be taken of the sensitivity of the Dominican Air Force to
intrusions within their national air space. "Cuban" B-2 6 or
C-46 type aircraft could make cane -burning raids at night.
Soviet Bloc incendiaries could be found. This could be coupled
with "Cuban" messages to the Communist underground in the
Dominican Republic and "Cuban" shipments of arms which would
be found, or intercepted, on the beach.
6. Use of MIG type aircraft by US pilots could provide
additional provocation. Harassment of civil air, attacks on
surface shipping and destruction of US military drone aircraft
by MG type planes would be useful as complementary actions.
An F-86 properly painted would convince air passengers that they
saw a Cuban MIG, especially if the pilot of the transport were
to announce such fact. The primary drawback to this suggestion
appears to be the security risk inherent in obtaining or modify-
ing an aircraft. However, reasonable copies of the MIG could
be produced from US resources in about three months.
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
9
7. Hijacking attempts against civil air and surface craft
should appear to continue as harassing measures condoned by the
government of Cuba. Concurrently, genuine defections of Cuban
civil and military air and surface craft should be encouraged.
8. It is possible to create an incident which will demonstrate
convincingly that a Cuban aircraft has attacked and shot down
a chartered civil airliner enroute from the United States to
Jamaica, Guatemala, Panama or Venezuela. The destination would
be chosen only to cause the flight plan route to cross Cuba.
The passengers could be a group of college students off on a
holiday or any grouping of persons with a oommon interest to
support chartering a non-scheduled flight.
a. An aircraft at Eglin AFB would be painted and
numbered as an exact duplicate for a civil registered
aircraft belonging to a CIA proprietary organization in the
Miami area. At a designated time the duplicate would be
substituted for the actual civil aircraft and would be
loaded with the selected passengers, all boarded under
carefully prepared aliases. The actual registered
aircraft would be converted to a drone.
b. Take off times of the drone aircraft and the actual .
aircraft will be scheduled to allow a rendezvous south of
Florida. From the rendezvous point the passenger-carrying
airoraft will descend to minimum altitude and go dlreotly
Into an auxiliary field at Eglin AFB where arrangements will
have been made to evacuate the passengers and return the
aircraft to its original status. The drone aircraft
meanwhile will continue to fly the filed flight plan. When
over Cuba the drone will being transmitting on the inter-
national distress frequency a "MAY DAY" message stating he
is under attack by Cuban MIG airoraft. The transmission
will be interrupted by destruction of the aircraft which will
be triggered by radio signal. This will allow ICAO radio
10
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
stations in the Western Hemisp
tore.
o tell the US what
has happened to the aircraft instead of the US trying to
"sell" the incident.
9. It is possible to create an incident which will make it
appear that Communist Cuban MIGs have destroyed a USAF aircraft
over international waters in an unprovoked attack.
a. Approximately 4 or 5 P-101 aircraft will be dispatched
in trail from Homestead APB, Florida, to the vicinity of Cuba.
Their mission will be to reverse course and simulate fakir
aircraft for an air defense exercise in southern Florida.
These aircraft would conduct variations of these flights at
frequent intervals. Crews would be briefed to remain at
least 12 miles off the Cuban coast; however, they would be
required to carry live ammunition in the event that hostile
actions were taken by the Cuban MIGs.
b. On one such flight, a pre -briefed pilot would fly
tail-end Charley at considerable interval between aircraft.
While near the Cuban Island this pilot would broadcast that
he had been Jumped by MIGs and was going down. No other
calls would be made. The pilot would then fly directly
west at extremely low altitude and land at a secure base, an
Eglin auxiliary. The aircraft would be met by the proper
people, quickly stored and given a new tail number. The
pilot who had performed the mission under an alias, would
resume his proper identity and return to his normal place
of business. The pilot and aircraft would then have
disappeared.
c. At precisely the same time that the aircraft was
presumably shot down a submarine or small surface craft
would disburse F-101 parts, parachute, etc., at approximately
15 to 20 miles off the Cuban coast and depart. The pilots
returning to Homestead would have a true story as far as
they knew. Search shipB and aircraft oouia be dispatched
and parts of airoraft found,
Annex to Appendix
to Enclosure A
ENCLOSURE B
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have previously stated*
that US unilateral military intervention in Cuba can be
undertaken in the event that the Cuban regime commits hostile
acts against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon' which to base overt intervention.
2. The need for positive action in the event that current
covert efforts to foster an internal Cuban rebellion are
unsuccessful was indicated** by the Joint Chiefs of Staff
on 7 March 1962, as follows:
" determination that a credible internal
revolt is impossible of attainment during the next
9-10 months will require a decision by the United States
to develop a Cuban "provocation" as Justification for
positive US military action."
3. It is understood that the Department of State also is
preparing suggested courses of action to develop Justification
for US military intervention in Cuba.
* JCS 1969/303
** JCS 1969/313
Enclosure B
12
THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON 25. D.C.
Sh-240-62
1 torch 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF. US ARMY
Subject: Procedures to be Followed In Handling
Central Intelligence Agency, State
Department and US Information Agency
Requests for DOD Support in Connection
\ with the Activities of the Caribbean
'v Survey Group (CSO) (S)
The Department of Defense has been requested to be
prepared to assist the Central Intelligence Agency, the
Department of State and the US Information Agency in
activities connected with the operations of the
Caribbean Survey Group. The enclosure seta forth the
procedures to be followed by the Services in handling
such requests for support.
Por the Joint Chiefs of Staff i
rv; I V
i> *
■■
r , . ;.VT.CiJ CCIiTm'J'D
Enclosure!
Subj as above
F. J. BLOUIN
RAdm, USN
Secretary
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
. * \ ... . ■ - 7:0 \ • •
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING: DOD DIR 5200.10
DOES NOT APPLY
n
i
• -
- .*I\ ■ \ .-*•
> * ••• • ; • *
r.V • '•/; • * # '
•*
»
* • •*. »
-i
-'■I- 1
r-ftsra*g?>
,wv»v)c<.i
SPECIAL HANDLING
1 March 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, CUBA PROJECT
Subjecti Procedures for DOD Support of the Operations
of CIA, the State Department, and the USIA
The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Mr. Qilpatric have
approved the attached paper, which is forwarded for
Tour information.
*
WILLIAM H. CRAIQ
Brig Qeneral, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
SPECIAL HANDLING
L-
MEMORANDUH FOR THE DOD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE
Caribbean Survey Group .
• •
Subject: Cuba Project
Kiexattached procedures are approved for
forwarding to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project,
as the DOD position with respect to support of the
CIA, the State Department, and USIA activities
connected with the Caribbean Survey Group.
fcXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REflSAD i!;°; D0D DIR 5200.10
WES NOT APPLY
■ III
C4MU
I*
tV.IJI
iiiai
ENCLOSURE .
PROCEDURES TO 3E FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE DEPARTMENT AND
tic -ft oi?OTTn*cypc nnn o Tip COO'D tm /•owwrn* t Am ».rT'ru 'put? AP'D TV T*P TOO
V •# • * « W «« *» W * wWA « V*»A AAI WA»4«J#V»A A • • • «• A *• • • W «b • *«*rf"*
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (CSG) (S)
. "•
1. Wien approved by the Secretary of Defense the DOD will
support fully on a high priority basis requests for support
• •• • • • * •
received in; writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the
US Information Agency in connection with the activities of
t- • »
the CSG.
2. CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency
should submit requests for DOD support to the Secretary of
Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations)). .These requests should contain sufficient infor-
mation of the overall plan or project to permit a determination
of the equipment best suited for accomplishment of the mission
and should include a code word to indicate the requested
assistance is in support of this project.
3. Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following
procedures will apply:
a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS
Representative of the CSG.
b. The DOD/JCS Representative will consult with the
Services and then secure the comments and recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will then return the
request with recommended action to the Secretary of Defense
for decision. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will be advised of the decision.
CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency
requests for DOD support involving significant numbers of
military personnel, amounts of equipment, or equipment in short
supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense
prior to the furnishing of such assistance.
Enclosure
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
lift!
iWilil'l
the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the
DOD will be retained under the control of the DOD when feasible
and consistent with the accomplishment of the mission.
6. As determined by the Secretary of Defense DOD agencies
will be reimbursed for support rendered CIA, the Department
of State and the US Information Agency in accordance with
• §• . • *
existing procedures. Otherwise, such support will be provided
within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of
reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of
the support requested.
7. Advance security planning will be made a part of all
projects that provide support to the CIA, the Department of
State and the US Information Agency. This advance security
planning will be in conformance with the provisions of DOD
Directive 5200.1, dated 8 July 1957.
8. In the event the Services receive requests for support
direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information
Agency, which involve significant numbers of military
personnel, amounts of military equipment, or equipment in
short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of
such requests.
7 February 1962
•
Decision ons
jcs 1969/303
(NORTHWOODS) (s)
SYSTuVATICAllYja(IEV
BY JGS$N — _ .
CLASSFiCATIOM OOWTWUcO.
33»M£=
At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved the recommendations of the DO D Representative
to the Caribbean Survey Group as set forth in paragraph 13
of the subject paper, as amended by ohanging the second para-
graph of Enclosure A so as to read: *
mmm !•«■■ ■ « ■ *** #
"2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that
the attached proposal be adopted as the official DOD
position and forwarded to the Chief of Operations,
Cuba Project."
It was also agreed that General Craig should oonvey to
the Deputy Secretary of Defense the Joint Chiefs' position
that General Craig should be the JCS Representative as well as
the DOD Representative to the Caribbean Survey Group. It was
further agreed that, in regard to clearances for NORTHWOODS,
the access list would be extended to include the four Service
Intelligence Chiefs, the Deputy Commander of TAC, the Deputy
Commander of CONARC, and the Connander of the l8th Airborne
Corps. AOM - (AJeU.IN.C5 SAYS
EXCLUDED FROM GOS
Copy tot
General Craig
M.l
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary
!
O — po$os series
2 ^
— copies eeofj
7 February 1962
Decision on:
jcs 1969/303
(NORTHWOODS) (S)
At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved BQEN Craig's recommendations as set forth
in paragraph 13 of the subject paper, as .amended by changes
in the second paragraph of Enclosure A.
1
Colonel, USAF
Deputy Secretary
Copy to:
r
General Craig
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
HOLDERS OF JCS 1969/311
A Note by the Secretaries
on
MORTHWOODS (S)
Holders are requested to substitute the attached revised
Decision On and to destroy the superseded Decision On in
accordance with security regulations.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INOELIDO
Joint Secretariat
EXCLUDED from gds
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC
REGRADING; DOD DIRECTIVE
5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY
JCS 1969/311
20 Februar y 1962
Page 2152
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NORTHWOODS (S)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for
consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat
EXCLUDED FROM AUTOMATIC REGRADING;
DOD DIR 5200.10 DOES NOT APPLY.
jcs 1969/311
' 2152
«C1UDED FROM CDS
JCS 1969/311
COPY NO. 1
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
DECISION ON JCS 1969/311
SYSTEVAT'CALl^jP^I^^ A Note by the Secretaries
CLASSinCAJIOH CONTINUED ' ' on
NORTHWOODS (S)
Note by the Secretaries
1. At their meeting on 20 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs
of Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 1 of
JCS 1969/311 as amended by changes in paragraphs 1, 3b, 4 and
6 of Appendix 1 to Enclosure C.
2. At their meeting on 23 February 1962 , the Joint Chiefs
of Staff reconsidered JCS 1969/311 and approved the reconunen-
dations in paragraph 1 , amended as indicated above, and as
further amended by changes to paragraph 2 and subparagraph 3 b
of Appendix 1 to Enclosure C.
3. The memorandum in Enclosure C was forwarded as JCSM- 158 - 62 ,
dated 28 February 1962, to the Secretary of Defense. The memo-
randum In Enclosure B was forwarded to: Chief of Staff , US Array
by SM-240-62; Chief of Naval Operations by SM-241-62; Chief of
Staff, US Air Force by SM-242-62; and Commandant of the Marine
Corps by SM-243-62. All SM's were dated 1 March 1962 .
4. In that the Commandant had expressed direct concern of
the Marine Corps In this matter, the provisions of Title 10,
US Code 141 ( 0 ), applied and were followed.
5. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached
t (
. ' <• i'v « . «■
ENCLOSURE A
PROCURES TO 3E FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATS DEPARTMENT
l^IA -^QUESTS FOR DCC SUPPORT ±N CONNECTION UITH THE ACTIVITIES
OP THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (CSC-) (S)
1. When approved by the Secretary of Defense the DOD will
support fully on a high priority basis requests for support
received in writing from the CIA, the State Department, and the
Us Information Agency in connection with the activities of
the CSO.
2. CIA, State Department and the US Inforraeticn Agency
should submit requests for DGD support to the Secretary of
Debase (Assistant to t ha Secretary of* Defense (Special
Operations)), These requests should contain sufficient infor-
mation cf the overall plen or project to permit a determination
of the equipment best suited for accompli shment of the mission
and should include a cods word to indicats the requested
assistance is in support of this project.
3* Upon receipt of such a request in writing the following
procedures will apply;
a. The Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations) will forward the request to the DOD/JCS
Representative of the C3G.
b. The DOD/JCS Representative will consult with the
Services and then secure the comments and recommendations
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He will then return the
request with recommended action to the Secretary of Defense
for decision. The Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
will be advised of the decision.
If * CIA, State Department and the US Information Agency
requests for DOD support involving significant numbers of
military personnel, amounts of equipment, or equipment in short
supply will require the approval of the Secretary of Defense
prior to the furnishing of such assistance.
Enclosure A
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 A 23 ?eb
\v (->. :«-* >:»' >•>*• v;
the Department of State and the US Information Agency from the
DOD will be retained under the control of the DOD when feasible
and consistent with t ho accomplishment of the mission.
6. As determined by the Secretary of Defense DCD agencies
will be reimbursed for support rendered CIA, the Department
of State and the US Information Agency in accordance with
existing procedures. Otherwise, such support will be provided
within the resources available to the DOD. Determination of
reimbursement will not in any way delay the implementation of
the support requested.
7. Advance security planning will ba made a part of all
projects that provide support to the CIA, the Department of
State and the US Information Agency. This advance security
planning will be in conformance with the previsions of DOD
Directive 5200.1. dated 8 July 195 /.
8. In the event the Services receive requests for support
direct from the CIA, the State Department and the US Information
Agency, which involve significant numbers of military
personnel, amounts of military equipment, or equipment in
short supply, they will inform the DOD/JCS Representative of
such requests.
d Enclosure A
(Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff 20 & 23 Feb £2
MEMORANDUM FOR: Secretary of State
Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Director, United States Information Agency
Subject: Procedures to oe Followed in Handling
Requests for DOD Support in Connection with
the Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group
1. Reference is made to the activities of the Caribbean
Survey Group (CSG) .
2. Requests for DOD support in connection with the activities
of the CSG should be submitted in writing to the Secretary of
Defense (Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Special
Operations)). In order to facilitate and expedite the
furnishing of such support, each request should contain
sufficient information of the overall plan or project to permit
a determination of the personnel and/or equipment best suited
for accompli shir.ent of the mission and an agreed code word to
indicate that the requested assistance is in support of this
project.
3. In regard to the funding of the operations, it is
desired that, as determined by the Secretary of Defense, DOD
agencies be reimbursed for support rendered in accordance with
existing procedures. Determination of reimbursement will not •
in any way delay the implementation cf the support requested.
In the event agreement cannot be reached quickly on the
funding, I propose that the funding problem be resolved at a
later date.
4. I trust that the above meets with your approval and
that you will inform me accordingly.
~ ^kQFORN
SOCIAL HANDLING
NOFORN —
m.m
REPORT BY THE DOD/JCS REPRESENTATIVE OF
THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GR OUP
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
PROCEDURES TO BE FOLLOWED IN HANDLING CIA, STATE
DEPARTM EN T AND US INFORMATION AGENC? REQUES TS FO R
POD SU P PORT IN CONNECTION WITH THE /. 7 P 1 VITIES
OF THE CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP (V i
1. The DOD/JCS Representative of the Caribbean Survey Group 1
recommends that the Joint Chiefs of Staff: 2
a. Note the contents of Enclosure A and Enclosure B. 3
b. Approve and forward Enclosure C, with Appendices, to 4
the Secretary of Defense. 5
c. After approval of the proposed procedures (Appendix 1 6
to Enclosure C) by the Secretary of Defense, transmit 7
Enclosure D to the Chief of Staff, US Army, Chief of Naval 8
Operations, Chief of Staff, US Air Force and the Commandant 9
of the Marine Corps.
T ' i>SD V 7.W.7ZC
HbClfA.-JH.vj; D3D DIP 5^00.10
i »’%* i;or Ai jj.Y
EXCLUDED FROM GDS
Special handling 1
cy._Z-.cf 2 ° copies
Amended as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff -
20 February 1962
I
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
Subject: Procedure to be Followed in Handling Central .In-
telligence Agency, State Department and US Inform-
ation Agency Requests for DOD Support in Connec-
tion with the Activities of the Caribbean Survey
Group
1. The attached memorandum for the Secretary of Defense recom-
mends procedures to be followed for DOD support of the operations
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), State Department and
US Information Agency (USIA) in connection with the activities
of the Caribbean Survey Group. Past experience indicates the
need for such procedures.
2. The recommended procedures are based upon the results of a
conference held with the Deputy Secretary of Defense on 30
January 1962 by the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG.
3. The procedures recommended to the Secretary of Defense
will afford full DOD support to the operations of the CIA, the
State Department and USIA in connection with the activities of
the CSG. At the same time, from the over-all point of view of
the US Government, it will protect the best interests of the DOD.
4. The procedures provide for the submission in writing of
requests for DOD support by the CIA, the State Department and
USIA to the Secretary of Defense, who will in turn refer the
requests to the DOD/JCS Representative on the CSG for evaluation.
The DOD/JCS Representative will secure the comments and recommend-
ations of the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff and then
forward the request with recommendations to the Secretary of
Defense for decision.
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative
Caribbean Survey Group
2
Enclosure A
Subject: Guidance from the Deputy Secretary of Defense
and his Reaction to Original Proposed Policy
for CIA Support by the Department of Defense
of CaribbeanSurvey Group (30 January 1962)
Mr. Gilpatric did not like this paper at all. He indicated
the paper was too negative and restricted as though a policy
towards an enemy like we are dealing with the Germans or Italians,
not a fellow department of our Government. This is a red line
operation with the blessing of the President and approved by
him as a most important task. This is probably the most
important mission we have in the government today. When a
request comes in from CIA, you (Craig) will evaluate it and
request the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their evaluation and
recommendations. The Secretary of Defense will determine,
after considering the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, what
the decision will be, not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This
decision is the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense.
We do not want to get involved in a case-by-case basis. We
do not want individual actions on each case. We do not want
masses of individual actions. This is a red line priority
problem and must be handled with dispatch and without getting
involved in minutia regarding expenses and reimbursement or
other details. Department of Defense may have to do it themselves
regardless who foots the bill. In some cases, CIA will be
required to reimburse if so determined by the Secretary of
Defense. This is a matter which must be decided by the
Secretary of Defense - not the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The
Department of Defense budgets for some CIA support. We have
equipment of some types lying around not being used and should
not require reimbursement for this type, as a general rule. This
must be decided by the Secretary of Defense after considering
an evaluation by the Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
There are some assetspwe ; ca£ gj^j^ong without and should make
these types available to the CIA without necessarily being
reimbursed for it. Mr. Gilpatrlc does not object to the
Joint Chiefs of Staff recommending to the Secretary of
Defense what equipment should be used for accomplishment of
stated mission and specific projects. I explained to Mr.
Gilpatrlc that we were not trying to obstruct the operation,
that we read our message loud and clear. I showed him Mr.
Bob Kennedy's instructions concerning which he stated: "I
can't add anything to that."
I discussed my meeting with Mr. McNamara of last Saturday
with Mr. Gilpatrlc. He indicated that Mr. McNamara had been
preoccupied on the Hill and had not known of latest developments
on this project, that he would inform him in regard to Mr.
McNamara's apprehensions as expressed to me last Saturday
concerning security, numbers in the Department of Defense who
knew of the project, etc. Mr. Gilpatrlc said I could inform
the people necessary regarding the project in order to get
the Job done. This was up to my Judgment. Mr. Gilpatrlc made
it clear that I was the DOD Representative and he wanted me to
make recommendations concerning requests for CIA support.
I emphasized the urgent requirement that the Services ‘
and Chiefs should determine the proper personnel and equipment
to be used for specific tasks since they were better qualified
as to capability and limitation of their equipment and personnel
than the CIA.
In summary, Mr. Gilpatrlc recognized the need for the estab-
lishment of a policy on this subject. He was most emphatic
that the decision as to whether or not a request was approved
was the prerogative of the Secretary of Defense NOT the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. However, the Secretary of Defense would like
to have evaluations and recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of
SPECIAL HANDLING
on the subject. He considered the approach used in our
original recommendations much too negative and directed me to
adopt a more positive approach in a new proposal.
WILLIAM H. CRAIG
Brig. General, USA
DOD/JCS Representative,
Caribbean Survey Group
VQ? SECRET
'■ NUKJKN
ENCLOSURE C
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling CIA,
State Department, and USIA Requests for
DOD Support in Connection with the
Activities of the Caribbean Survey Group.
1. Reference is made to the memorandum for Brigadier 1
General William H. Craig, USA, from the Assistant to the 2
Secretary of Defense, subject: "Special Projects", dated 3
17 January 1962. 4
2. The referenced memorandum states: 5
!!b. Department of Defense must be prepared to assist 6
fully Central Intelligence Agency and Department of State 7
in * * * operations as Defense commitments of men, money, 8
and materials are required." 9
and invited formal recommendations concerning the Defense 10
role and contributions. 11
3. Enclosure 1 recommends procedures for DOD support 12
of the operations of the Central Intelligence Agency, the 13
State Department and the US Information Agency in connection 14
with the activities of the Caribbean Survey Group (CSG). 15
4. Enclosure 2 is a draft of a recommended memorandum for 16
the Secretary of State, the Director, Central Intelligence, 17
and the US Information Agency setting forth procedures 18
governing DOD support of the operations of the CSG. 19
5. Issuance of the recommended memoranda should assure 20
that the procedures governing DOD support of the operations 21
of the CSG are followed. 22
ENCLOSURE
DRAFT
MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Staff, US Army
Chief of Naval Operations
Chief of Staff, US Air Force
Commandant of the Marine Corps
Subject: Procedures to be Followed in Handling Central
Intelligence Agency, State Department and US
Information Agency Requests for DOD Support in
Connection with the Activities of the Caribbean
Survey Group (C5G)
The Depart:-, vit of Defense has been request ; v to be prepared
to assist the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Department
of State,, and the US Information Agency in activities connected
with the operations of the Caribbean Survey Group. The en-
closure sets forth the procedures to be fo?.lowed by the Services
in handling such requests for support.
ip SF' RET ■
JOINT. CHIEFS OF STAFF
„ DECISION ON * JCS .1969/303
A Note by the Secretaries
on
• NORTHWOODS fs)
Note by the Secretaries
•-v
1. At their meeting on 7 February 1962 the Joint Chiefs of
Staff approved the recommendations in paragraph 13 of JCS
1969/303 as amended by changes in the second paragraph of
Enclosure A.
2. This decision now becomes a part of and shall be attached
as the top sheet of JCS 1969 / 303 .
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGEL IDO
Joint Secretariat
SYSTEMATICALLY REV.
BY JCS CiV J
class;;*, catoi contIkued
SECRET
COPY NO.
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
1
Page 2144
COPY NO.
SPECIAL DISTRIBUTION
NOTE BY THE SECRETARIES
to the
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
NO RTH WOODS fS)
A report* on the above subject is submitted for considera-
tion by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
F. J. BLOUIN
M. J. INGELIDO
Joint Secretariat
* Not reproduced; on file in Joint Secretariat
JCS 1969/303
2144
EXCLUDED FROM GDJ
JOP SECRET [\|OLRL
SPECIAL HANDLING
)»■ ' • ">*
* * K i Vl - .•?: . ’ ; -NOPORN
SPECIAL HANDLING
REPORT BY THE DEPARTMENT OP DEFENSE AND THE
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF REPRESENTATIVE OF THE
CARIBBEAN SURVEY GROUP TO THE CHAIRMAN,
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
on
CUBAN PROJECT
EXCLUDED FROM CDS
CRET
EXCLUDED FBOJ.’
IiECRAD l HO : DOIJ DIR
COES ROT Ai’H.Y
CS6&& 0^3/
\ (f) g K H ■ !?. !K : ; ['-N0F0ra
POSITION OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, CUBA PROJECT
THE PROBLEM
I. Act requested by the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project*
to determine a firm US position regarding the stake and role
of the Department of Defense in the event US assistance is
requested in support of Cuban insurgent efforts to overthrow
the- lastro government.
ASSUMPTIONS
:• National Security Policy concerning overthrow of the
C?.y';/*o r.\v:..ns is as agreed at the 9 Hay 196 l meeting of the
Mat-* •? vfj .W-.cuvity Council . **
•}:•:%* • -.ruation in Cuba will bo as reflected in current
National .Intelligence Estimates.***
Cpu.vtion? srainst the Castro government will be covert
in the . ST^y-3.
TJv.c faw.Vi ’.-he Castro government.
FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
{ . . At the 5 May 1961 meeting** of the National Security
Council it was agreed that US policy toward Cuba should aim at
the downfall of Castro. Other significant elements of policy
determined at that meeting we re:
a. The United States should not undertake military inter-
vention in Cuba at that time but should do nothing to fore-
close the possibility of military intervention in the future.
b. The United States should not impose a naval blockade
or attempt an air war against Cuba.
* Memorandum from Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF, for
Brigadier General V/. H. Craig, USA, subject: "Special
Project" dated 17 Jan 1962 , not on file in Joint Secretariat
** Enclosure to JCS 2304/36
*** SNIE 85-61, dated 28 Nov 61, also NIE 85-62 to be published
7 Feb 1962, both documents will be available through Joint
Secretariat
t v;!P SKCRKT
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
ffQFoEft
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
c. The direction of the President that the Central
Intelligence Agency, with other departments. Should make
a detailed study of possible weaknesses, and vulnerabilities
in t:?.e elements which exert control in Cuba, was noted.
7. For additional facts, see Enclosure B.
DISCUSSION
S. For discussion, see Enclosure C.
CONCLUSIONS
The basic military implications of Castro's Communist
gove-'U'.uv.- are as follows:
a . i v.* exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
•>• s '-.hreat to its security. This increases our
vulnerability and defense costs as forces are
dw9lc,:ed or shifted to meet this threat.
b. ’ v. provliw: the Soviet Union with the most effective
b they hrve firmer had for spreading Communism throughout
tbs Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases
p.'.c.cibi] A ty that additional Latin American countries
• r
1 •’ coir.« ynder Communist control. Elimination of this
• -a:-’.) would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that
the United States will not tolerate such intrusions.
Communist control of additional countries would or could
result in:
(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on
other nations o£ the Western Hemisphere;
(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading
Communigm throughout; Latin America;
(3) Th§ loss of existing and/or potential bases, training
I •{'•■ •
areas, facilitjipg and rights, as well as sources of
strategic materials necessary to our military capability;
tw mvmt
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED distribution
(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of
the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.
10. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly
increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the
Vies tern Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout
theh.:-ni sphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if
courses of action within the capability of tne Communists are
considered :
c.. vo Soviets couM establish land, sea and/or air bases
in OiV’f .
:'.\a Soviets could provide C astro with a number of
LtO.liefcic missiles with nuclear warheads ; or they could
y.'3'.'nith the missiles and maintain Joir.t control of the
1.1. In view *u* ^:-o factors set forth above, the Department
of Dafen-M* holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is
incompatible with the minimum security requirements of the
VJosiern \ere. The Department of Defense is prepared to
*
ova: liy support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent
of ovvting the Communist regime and installing a government
acce?tab> .• to the United States. While the possibility of
Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than Cuba is
recognized, it Is believed that the project objective can be
accomplished without precipitating general war, and without
serious effect on world public opinion if the following four
conditions prevail :
a. If the impression is created that there Is an
urgent, humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba
and/or the United States is responding to an appeal for
assistance from a government -• representative of the
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOFORN
LimItEu DISTRI BUTION
i); ;; :*)/
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NO PORN
EB'MTED distribution
b. If it is announced prior to the overt military action
t v i.';t the United States and/or other members of the OAS are
moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and
holding free elections, and that they will immediately
withdraw as soon as the new government advises that they
hv/e the capability to maintain order without further
assistance from OAS nations.
c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly
a:- possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist
Bloc* o.ji.lilt y to take effective counter-measures in support
•:f thoi Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.
d. Jr, if the Cuban regime ccrmiit3 hostile acts against
X>:, forces or property which would serve as an incident
u : *on which to base overt US interventions . In this event,
rpp*. ioc-b-.e portions of a,b, and c above apply.
1C:. Lopa-tment of Defense is also prepared to covertly
provide support to CIA and State, or through these agencies,
to z:vj US approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of
supplies, transportation , personnel and bases.
RECOMMENDATIONS
§
1;J. It recommended that:
a. The memorandum at Enclosure A hereto, which reflects
tho above conclusions, be forwarded to the Secretary of
b. This paper NOT be forwarded to commanders of unified
or specified commands.
c. This paper NOT be forwarded to US officers assigned to
NATO activities.
d. This paper NOT be forwarded to the Chairman, US
Delegation, United Nations Military Staff Committee.
►PECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOFORN
ENCLOSURE A
MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OP DEFENSE
Subject : Cuba
1. Pursuant to the objectives of the Caribbean Survey Group,
the Department of Defense was requested* to construct a firm
position with respect to the Department's stake and role in the
removal of the Communist regime in Cuba.
2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the attached
proposal be adopted as the official DOD position and forwarded
to the Chief of Operations, Cuba Project.
kSSTX™ ®£®??‘ e S5i E ' ^dale, USAF, for
riAhfd 1 ? r To« W i2ro C USA ' subject : "Special Project",
dated 17 Jan 1962; not on file in Joint Secretariat
As amended by JCS at meeting on 7 Febraary 1962
SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOFORN
LIMITED DISTRIBUTION
APPENDIX 1 TO ENCLOSURE A
DRAFT
MEMG.ivAlX'JM FOR BRIGADIER GENERAL E. G. LANSDALE,
Chief of Operations, Cuba rroject
Subject: Cuba Project
Reference: Memorandum from Your Office for
BrigGen W. H. • Craig, USA, sub j :
"Special Project", dated 17 Jan 62
1. As requested in referenced memorandum, the position of
the Department of Defense, with respect to the military stake
and i* *!e in the removal cf the Communist regime in Cuba, ha3
been determined based upon the following factors:
National Security Policy, determined by the NSC during
via* meeting of 9 May 1961.
b. Current intelligence estimates cf the situation in
c. Operation?-, against the Castro regime will be covert,
at lei^z initially.
d. Time favors the Castro government.
2. The b?si:; military implications of Castro's Communist
govu.vnme;.' are as follows:
a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
serious threat to its security. This increases our national
vulnerability and defense costs as forces are developed
or shifted to meet this threat.
b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective
base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout
the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly increases the
possibility that additional Latin American countries will
come under Communist control. Elimination of this base would
demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the United
States will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist
control of additional countries would or could result in:
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
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other nations of the Western Hemisphere.
(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading
Communism throughout Latin America.
(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases,
training areas, facilities and rights, as well as sources
of strategic materials necessary to our military
capability.
(4) An increased threat to US usage and control
of the Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.
3. The urgency of the requirement to remoye the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly
Increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the
Western Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the
hemisphere. This sense of urgency is greatly increased if
courses of action within the capability of the Communists
are considered:
a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air
bases in Cuba.
b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads; or they could
furnish the missiles and maintain Joint control of the
nuclear warheads.
4. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of
Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
viith the minimum security requirements of the Western
Hemisphere. The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly
support any popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of
ousting the Communist regime and installing a government
acceptable to the United States. While the possibility of
Communist Bloc reactions in areas other than in Cuba is
recognized, it is believed that this can be accomplished without
precipitating general war, and without serious effect on
world public opinion if the following conditions prevail:
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
2
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a. li* the impression is created that there is an urgent,
humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or the
United Scates is responding to an appeal for assistance from
a government representative of the Cuban people.
If it is announced incident to the overt military
action that the United States and/or members of the OAS are
moving into Cuba for the purpose of restoring order and holding
free elections, and that they will immediately withdraw as soon
as the new government advises that they have the capability
to maintain order without further assistance from the OAS
nations.
i c. If the military operation is conducted as quickly
ai possible and with sufficient force no that the Communist
B’.oc's ability to take effective counter-measures in support
of Che Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.
d. Or. ii the Cuban regime commits hostile acts against
US forces or property which would serve as an incident upon
which to base overt US intervention. In this event, applicable
portion: cf a, b, and c above apply.
5. The Apartment of Defense is also prepared to covertly
provide support to CIA or State, or any US approved popular
movement inside Cuba, in terras of supplies, transportation,
personnel and bases.
Appendix 1 to
Enclosure A
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FACTS BEARING ON THE PROBLEM
1. The over -all plan* for the overthrow of the Castro
gover:rcent is responsive to the following objective:
’’Th? US objective is to help the Cubans overthrow-/
the Communist regime from within Cuba and institute a
r.eu government with which the United States can live in
peace. "
2. It is becoming increasingly evident that the Castro regime,
aided materially, morally and financially by the Sino -Soviet
Bloc, hop become firmly entrenched. Over the past two and one-
half yea: 6, the Cascro regime has gradually built up a police
state on the Slr.o -Soviet model. The first step was the
immediate replacement of the existing Cuban Army and police
force by revolutionary units which had fought with Castro during
the revolution in the hills and in the underground . Changes in
the Navy and Air Force were accomplished through purges of top
personnel. Toward the end of 1959 as disillusionment and opposi-
tion over the drift toward closer association v/ith the Sino-
Soviet Bloc began to crystalize within the regular armed forces,
the regime again shifted its basis of power, this time to the
newly -formed civilian worker -peasant -student militia. Dr. Castro
looked upon thi3 militia as a presumably more reliable military
force. For almost a year the militia maintained its status as
a para -military organization under labor union and student
federation leadership. On 29 September i 960 , Castro reorganized
the militia alons military lines and the chief of the corresponding
military district took over command of the militia units.
Specifically trained officers replaced the original militia
commanders and military training was accelerated.
* Program Review by Brigadier General E. G. Lansdale, USAF,
subject: "The Cuba Project", dated 18 Jan 1962; not on
file in the Joint Secretariat.
Enclosure B
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3 SlrcrJ.taneously, the Castro regime was also building its
sec*uv_ty network*, !n June 1961, the process culminated with
the establishment of a Ministry of Interior with responsibility
for tiaintjining "public order". The decree centralizes the
various police and investigation units under the new ministry.
It also gave tne Ministry authority to supervise the activities
of "Committee*: for the Defense of the Revolution". These
commltte arc responsible for informing authorities of "counter-
revolutionary* activities or attitudes. A campaign is under way
to establish 100, 00C of such committees with ?0,000 'volunteer"
members in offices, factories, schools, churches, cooperatives,
resident::. vA are?. 3, etc. By centralizing the police Auction
and combining it with a vast network of informers, the Castro
regime ha? established a security system on the Communist Bloc
model .
4 . In support of this military and security build-up, Castro
forces have been equipped with arms and materiel from the Sino-
Sovlet Bloc countries, i.e., Czechoslovakia and Russia.- In-
formation l.jc'ic.ates the Cuban force is well equipped with
modern weapons and that there is in Cuba an actual surplus of
military equipment for the force in being. Some accounts
indicate that certain materiel is rather sophisticated, and
Includes EM radar, fire control systems, advanced fighters,
short and possibly medium range rockets. It becomes obvious
that the Castro forces are being trained and equipped for
operations far beyond that required to maintain law and order
and internal security. This represents a continuous threat to
the Western Hemisphere, and is a Communist stronghold for the
* of s $f te w J£J e Pa Per, subject: "The Castro Regime
in Cuba , recently published but undated; not on file in
Joint Secretariat
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Enclosure B
continued spread of Communism to other countries of the
inter -American System.
5 . In response to a request* by the President in April 1961
the 2 Jsfer.se Department has already planned for the over-
throw 'ji the Castro government by use of military force. In
the event formal, overt commitment of US forces in Cuba should
become necessary there are now two US military plans** in being
; f of which could be implemented. Both plans provide for
uic vujployment of sizeable US forces and are designed, among
oth— toward the over-throw of the Castro -government as
ripidly • possible.
a. t.’cCLANT OPLAN 314 - 61 , ** approved*** by the Joint Chiefs
.. provides for* a simultaneous amphibious and airborne
:av..: within 18 days after the execution order, assuming
; - c - V*' 1 -'* a * °rt or prepositioning of forces. After the intial
aasav - .. it is estimated that overthrow of the Castro
g-werr. .<;nc c Ui .he gain of essential control of Cuba would
M assured in 10 days., |/
b. CINCLANT OPLAN 3 l 6 - 6 l,** designed for a |f as ter commitment
of US forces, provides for an airborne assault within 5 days
of the execution order. However, since this plan deploys
fewer forces initially, no estimate i3 made concerning the
length of time required for overthrow of the government or
control of Cuba. This latter plan, not yet approved by the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, is in process of Uninor- revision, ily
CINCLANT.
* jcs 2304/29
** CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 314 -6l (Cuba), and
CINCLANT Contingency Operations Plan 316-61 (Cuba), both
plans on file in Joint Secretariat
*** jcs 2010/306
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ENCLOSURE C
DISCUSSION
1. Although it is possible that a Cuban counter-revolutionary
leader -ould emerge with sufficient appeal to enable the anti-
Cas elements to unite in an attempt to seize power, such
eventuality does not seem likely unless fostered and supported
by the United States. To date, exiled Cubans have failed to
pioduce such a leader.* Even the loss of Castro by assassination
o: by natural casues, while unsettling on the government, would
a j. Most certainly not prove fatal to the regime.** It is there -
frre expected that no Cuban leader or insurgent group can
independently undertake a significant subversion effort against
the government with any reasonable chance of success.
2 . Even a cursory look at Castro's military preparations to
defend Cuba indicates that a purely overt attempt to overthrow
the Castro government can only be accomplished by a well conceived
military plan in significant force, requiring military inter-
vention by the United States.
3- As long as Cuba does not become a member and an accepted
military partner of the Warsaw Pact the threat of general war as
a result of US military intervention in Cuba does not appear to
exist.
4. It is expected that the Castro government will avoid giving
the United States sufficient provocation for armed intervention.
For this reason Cuban forces are not expected to be committed to
an attack on the US Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay. Neither is it
* J-2 DM-400-61, "After the Assassination of Castro ' What*>"
dated 27 October 1961 ; on file in J-2
** SNIE 85 - 61 , "The Situation and Prospects in Cuba", dated
28 Nov 61 i on file in Joint Secretariat
Enclosure C
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expected that Castro will allow a definite relationship to become
known or apparent between his government and communist attempts
at inf ilitration and subversion of other Latin American states.
5 It is postulated therefore, that to progress in following
th- :-:*;ablished national policy of aiming at the downfall of
C£‘j cro, it will be necessary for the United States to support
a selected Cuban insurgent attempt from the outset and to be
prepared to sustain such insurgent program t.; a successful
conclusion, including overt military intervention as the final
and decisive step.
6. It is clear that the United States cannot afford repetition
of the unfortunate miscalculation of the political aspirations
of Fidel Castro in the desire to s:-.s an end to the Batista regime.
It would appear that a significant lesson of this costly mistake
Is the requirement for emphasis and improvement in US intelligence
efforts to evaluate the true colors of potentially capable
personalities and groups which eventually may have to be
recognized and supported by the United States in future counter-
revolutionary undertakings.
7. The basic military implications of Castro ' 3 Communist
government are as follows:
a. It exposes the Western Hemisphere to an increasingly
serious threat to its security. This increases our national
vulnerability and defense costs as forces arc developed or
shifted to meet this threat.
b. It provides the Soviet Union with the most effective
base they have ever had for spreading Communism throughout
the Western Hemisphere. This in turn greatly Increases the
possibility that additional Latin American countries will come
under Communist control. Elimination of this base in Cuba
would demonstrate to the other nations of the world that the
US will not tolerate such intrusions. Communist control of
additional countries would or could result in:
J w *
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(1) Increased Communist capability for attack on other
nations of the Western Hemisphere.
(2) Increased Communist capability for spreading
Communism throughout Latin America.
(3) The loss of existing and/or potential bases, train-
ing areas, facilities and rights, as we 11 as sources of
strategic materiels necessary to our military capability.
(4) An increased threat to US usage and control of the .
Panama Canal through subversion and sabotage.
8. The urgency of the requirement to remove the Communist
government from Cuba is made apparent by Castro's constantly
increasing capabilities for attacking other nations of the Western
Hemisphere and for spreading Communism throughout the hemisphere.
This sense of urgency is greatly increased if courses of action
within the capability of the Communists are considered:
a. The Soviets could establish land, sea and/or air
bases in Cuba.
b. The Soviets could provide Castro with a number of
ballistic missiles with nuclear warheads, or they could
furnish the missiles and maintain joint control of the
nuclear warheads.
9. In view of the factors set forth above, the Department of
Defense holds that the Communist regime in Cuba is incompatible
with the minimum security requirements of the Western Hemisphere.
The Department of Defense is prepared to overtly support any
popular movement inside Cuba to the extent of ousting the
Communist regime and installing a government acceptable to the
United States. While the possibility of Communist Bloc
reactions in areas other than in Cuba is recognized, it is
believed that this can be accomplished without precipitating
general war, and without serious effect on world public opinion
if the following conditions prevail:
3 Enclosure C
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a. If the impression is created that there is an urgent,
humanitarian requirement to restore order in Cuba and/or
the United States is responding to an appeal for assistance
froni a government representative of the Cuban people.
b. If it is announced incident to the overt military
action that the United States and/or other members of the OAS
are moving into Cuba for the purpose ol‘ restoring order
and holding free elections, and that they v.'i.ll immediately
withdraw a3 soon as the new government advises that they
have the capability to maintain order without further assis-
tance from OAS nations.
c. If the military operation :-.s conducted as qvickly
as possible and with sufficient force so that the Communist
Bloc's ability to take effective counter-measures in
support of the Castro regime is reduced to a minimum.
d. Or, if the Cuban regime commits hostile acts
against US forces or property which would serve as an
incident upon which to base overt US intervention. In this
event, applicable portions of a, b, and c above apply.
10. The Department of Defense is also prepared to covertly
provide support to CIA, or through these agencies, to any US
approved popular movement inside Cuba, in terms of supplies,
transportation, personnel and bases.
4
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